ACTIVISTS, CATEGORIES AND MARKETS: RACIAL DIVERSITY AND PROTESTS AGAINST WALMART STORE OPENINGS IN AMERICA

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Identity movements rely on a shared we-feeling amongst a community of participants. In turn, such shared identities are possible when movement participants can self-categorize themselves as belonging to one group. We address a debate as to whether community diversity enhances or impedes such protests, and investigate the role of racial diversity since it is a simple, accessible, and visible basis of community diversity and social categorization. We focus on American communities' protests against Wal-Mart's entry from 1998 until 2005 and ask whether racial diversity affects protests after accounting for a community's sense of pride and attachment to their town. We use distance from historical monuments as a proxy of a community's pride and attachment, and after controlling for it, we find that community's racial homogeneity significantly increases protests against Wal-Mart.

A basic proposition in the literature on social movements is that collective action is more likely when members share common collective identities - a 'we-feeling' sustained through interactions among movement participants, and expressed through cultural materials such as names, narratives, symbols, and rituals (Taylor and Whittier 1992). The premise is that identification with a group helps group members overcome the collective action dilemma (Klandermans, 2002), and that identification is possible when individuals self-categorize themselves as belonging to the same group and stereotype themselves and others as similar (Tajfel and Turner, 1979).

Strikingly, however, it is only recently that social movement researchers have devoted attention to the linkage amongst a community's demographic characteristics, shared identity and the incidence of protests. A number of sociologists have argued that there is a link between a community's socio-demographic structure and collective action (Molotch, Freudenberg, and Paulsen, 2000; Sampson et al., 2005) – the basic intuition is that potential identities are inherent in the socio-demographic characteristics of a focal community and becoming activated and thereby, embodied in collective action. However, there is a debate as to how socio-demographic structure evokes identity.

One view is that homogeneity makes it easier for activists to mobilize collective action. Tilly (1973), argued that a community that consists of homogenous groups would generally be mobilized at lower cost than a heterogeneous community. In a recent review, Costa and Kahn (2003) show that 15 papers show that heterogeneity reduces solidarity, and therefore, civic engagement to produce public goods. In their study of social protest against chain-stores, Ingram and Rao (2004) reported that states in which independent businesses were concentrated in a retail segment were able to more easily mobilize to protest against chain stores than states where retail businesses spanned many segments. Miguel and Gugerty (2005) reviewed a number of studies which suggested that ethnic diversity in communities impeded collective action.

A rival argument is that socio-demographic diversity fosters collective action. Hardin (1982) reasoned that heterogeneous groups are more likely to contain interested and resourceful members who may provide collective goods. Diversity makes it possible for activists to mobilize different constituencies (Oberschall, 1973; McAdam, 1982). Kocak and Carroll (2005) found that the arrival of new immigrant groups with different religious backgrounds activated the identities of existing groups in a community and increased church attendance. Okamoto (2003) observed that segregation of Asian Americans as a group fostered collective action. Greve, Pozner and Rao (2006) also found that educational diversity powered the formation of low-power FM radio stations.

We focus attention on the role of racial diversity since it is a simple, accessible, and visible dimension of diversity and categorization. We ask if the racial diversity of a community increases or reduces against protests against Wal-Mart's entry into a community during the period starting from 1998 and ending in 2005. Critically, the participants in social movements that target organizations are different than those that target states. Most obviously, they need to overcome the dearth of a cohesive identity. Those who stand against the state may be united under the umbrella of "citizens" but what of those who oppose Wal-Mart? All social movements must have the bases of collective action, but the problem is heightened in this case because the anti-Wal-Mart forces do not represent any natural group or category that might be referenced to evoke recognition of shared interests.

We note that our interest lies in understanding whether racial diversity is a causal mechanism that explains protest against Wal-Mart and not whether it enables accurate predictions of the probability of protest against Wal-Mart in a particular community. A previous study by Ingram, Yue and Rao (2010) showed that community level characteristics do not allow for good predictions of protests against Wal-Mart and suggested that Wal-Mart faced uncertainty in predicting protests. So Wal-Mart relies on low-cost probes that take the form of proposals to open a store, and withdraws if it face protests that are a) backed by a special organization opposing Wal-Mart, or b) occur in a

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community surrounded by other protesting communities, or c) in a state where tough restrictions on the size of the store have been placed (Ingram, Yue and Rao, 2010).

A number of scholars suggest that explanation rather than prediction ought to be a test of the causal adequacy of a theory (See Elster, 1999; Liberson and Lynn, 2002). Scriven (1959:477) opined that "Satisfactory explanation of the past is possible even when prediction of the future is impossible" (p. 477). Accordingly, we draw on data from Ingram, Yue and Rao (2010) to understand the explanatory role of racial diversity. Of course, a causal mechanism ought to account for alternative mechanisms or causes of the outcome (Elster, 1999). Accordingly, in our case, we account for a community's pride and attachment to the place that might underlie its propensity against a Wal-Mart store. We use distance from historical monuments as a proxy – communities with such a monument or close to it are likely to have attachment when compared to communities far away from such monuments. We ask if racial diversity has a causal role despite accounting for a community's pride and attachment to a place. We recognize that protests against Wal-Mart stores are only possible if Wal-Mart proposes to open a store in the community in the first place – so there is a selection bias. We use a two –stage Heckman procedure to account for selection to understand the effect of racial diversity on protests against Wal-Mart.

RACIAL DIVERSITY, SHARED IDENTITY AND PROTEST

Social identification theory and its successor, self-categorization theory suggest rely on the notion of psychological groups. Turner (1984:530) defined a psychological group as "a collection of people who share the same social identification or define themselves in terms of the same social category member-ship." Thus, members of a psychological group do not need to interact with or like other members, or be in turn, be liked and accepted by them. Thus, psychological groups can comprise of anonymous individuals. By contrast, social groups require interaction and liking for cohesion to

ensue. A number of studies have shown that minimal group structure is enough to trigger self-categorization as a member of a psychological group; simply assigning an individual to a group is sufficient to generate in-group favoritism (Abrams and Hogg, 2004).

Race is one of the 'big three' categories in person perception – the other two being sex and age (Fiske and Neuberg, 1990). A number of studies show that race categories are chronically accessible to anyone in America (e.g. Dovodio et al. 1997; Fazio et al, 1997). Race is simple, accessible, and a visible basis of categorizing onself as a member of a psychological group. Typically, race based categories enable individuals to construct a clear group prototype and also to assess their own self-protypicality, and thereby, reduce uncertainty (Hogg and Abrams, 1993). Self-categorization *depersonalizes* perception and conduct such that members, including oneself, are not processed as complex, multidimensional whole persons but rather as embodiments of the contextually salient group prototype. (Hogg & Hains, 1996, p. 295).

From the perspective of the members of a collectivity, individuals are more likely to identify with others that are similar to themselves. As a result, cohesion is especially strong within a homogeneous group, and members are also more likely to identify themselves with a cohesive group that conveys conformity rewards from other members. In a homogeneous community, the barriers of collective action can be overcome, and community members can be more easily mobilized to defend their common interests (Yue, Luo, and Ingram, 2009). Thus we expect that communities with high levels of racial homogeneity are more likely to mobilize protests against Wal-Mart.

The rival argument is that racial diversity fosters collective action because heterogeneous groups are more likely to contain resourceful members who may provide collective goods (Hardin, 1982) and mobilize different constituencies (Oberschall, 1973; McAdam, 1982). So here the prediction is that racial diversity is likely to increase protests against Wal-Mart.

WAL-MART: GROWTH, DOMAIN CONSENSUS, AND SOCIAL PROTEST

Wal-Mart is the largest company in the world. In 2008 its sales reached 401 billion dollars, and it operated 7,873 stores and hired more than 2 million people worldwide. Wal-Mart is also a fast-growing company. Its origins can be traced back to a discount store that Sam Walton established in 1962. Wal-Mart's growth strategy is strikingly different from many other big box retailers. Instead of establishing stores near major urban centers where the population concentrates, Wal-Mart expands from its Arkansas base by constructing new stores that are strategically located near distribution centers and in smaller towns. Wal-Mart's discount stores were located in towns with populations of 5,000 to 25,000 and sought to draw customers from a large radius offering a wide variety of name-brand goods at discounted prices. Meanwhile, Wal-Mart has constantly been experimenting new store forms. In 1988, Wal-Mart introduced the Supercenters– stores with 150,000-250,000 square feet of space. The Supercenter is a regular discount store plus a full line of grocery and other arrays of products, and is designed to promote one-stop shopping. The supercenter has been Wal-Mart's major growth engine in the U.S. since the 1990s, and by the end of 2008 there were 2,612 Supercenters in the U.S. versus only 891 discount stores. After 2000, Wal-Mart invested more resources in expanding the Neighborhood Markets – 40,000 square foot grocery markets to penetrate into small towns that could not sustain supercenters or urban areas that could not satisfy the demand of the space of a supercenter. By the end of 2008, there were 153 Neighborhood Markets in the U.S. Figure 1 describes the total number of Wal-Mart stores in the U.S. from 1962 to 2008.

Insert Figure 1 about Here

Wal-Mart's expansion agitates fierce debates by the public. Critics blame Wal-Mart's unprecedented scale of operation for undermining communities. They argue that Wal-Mart drives out mom-and-pop stores and thus erases the characteristics of local communities and destroys an epicenter

of an organic community life. They further argue that Wal-Mart's low price policy has put up a high social cost, as its wage level lowers the living standard of the working class and its reliance on cheap imports from oversea causes the loss of jobs in American communities. By contrast supporters perceive Wal-Mart's economies of scale as a source of efficiency and economic gains. They argue that Wal-Mart's replacement of other stores is a typical instance of creative disruption in which inefficient business models are selected out by competition. They further argue that Wal-Mart's low-price policy is not a peril but a boon to the working class, as it enhances the purchase power of the poor and affords them more economic freedom.

Echoing the divide in public opinion, academic research on the effects of Wal-Mart stores shows that they have mixed effects on the communities in which they are located. For example, retail employment declines as a result of Wal-Mart entry (Basker, 2005a, Dube, Eidlin and Lester, 2007), but consumers benefit from 3% overall price declines in competing stores, and in the case of some items, the declines are as high as 13% (Basker, 2005b, Hausman and Leibtag, 2005). Regarding the impact on other retailers, some scholars find that Wal-Mart has negative effects on local retailers (Irwin and Clark, 2006; Jia, 2008), and supercenters undermine grocery stores and other retailers. But others find that Wal-Mart has no harmful impact on small retailers and self-employment (Dean and Sobel, 2008). Some even further find that small stores that locate close to Wal-Mart but have a low degree of product overlap with Wal-Mart benefit from Wal-Mart's entry (Zhu, Singh, and Dukes, 2005).

The mixed effects paint a clouded picture about whether a community will protest Wal-Mart's entry and highlight the necessity to understand the factors that underlies the mobilization of communities. A case is useful to illustrate what Wal-Mart's expansion looks like on the ground, and how protests may play out. The small town of Damariscotta, Maine has about 2000 people and a prosperous downtown. Wal-Mart proposed to build a supercenter there in 2005. The town already had a grocery store that boasted an 85 year old lineage, a department store, a hardware store, a bookstore

and a pharmacy. Three other Wal-Mart stores were within 30 minutes of Damariscotta in the north, west and south directions. In September 2005, there were rumors that a Portland, ME attorney representing an unnamed client was in town to promote a 109,000 square foot store with the Land Use Planning Committee of Damariscotta, and the unnamed client was widely suspected to be Wal-Mart. Two individuals, Eleanor Kinney and Jenny Mayher, set up Our Town Damriscotta, and secured the support of 200 residents and business owners. Their espoused goal was to preserve the small town sense of solidarity and prevent sprawl and congestion, and they launched a campaign to put into place a size cap, or a restriction, on the size of any store that could be established in the town. Their proposal was to establish a limit of 35,000 square feet as the maximum possible size of any new store. Our Town attracted volunteers, set up phone banks, distributed lawn signs, and rallied support for the size cap ordinance that would prevent Wal-Mart's entry. Using a petition, they won the right to put the size-cap regulation to a referendum of Damariscotta's residents. Damariscotta is in many ways typical of the places. Damariscotta is homogenous, with more than 98% of the residents being white. Below we analyze homogeneity of a population as an indicator of cohesion which is particularly significant as an antecedent for mobilization against Wal-Mart.

DATA AND METHODS

Our dependent variable is the incidence of protest against Wal-Mart's proposal to open a new store. We investigated the effect of racial diversity on protests using a dataset of all the places where Wal-Mart proposed to open new stores from 1998 to 2005[i]. Our unit of analysis is place, which refers to a city, town, village or unincorporated census area. Place is generally a smaller unit than county and there were 25,375 places in the U.S. in 2000.

We compiled the dataset from three different sources. First, we used a list of all Wal-Mart store openings from 1962 to 2005.[ii] We estimated the proposal time for each of the opened stores as 789

days before the opening, a figure that represents the average time between proposal and opening for stores where both dates are available. Second, we collected protest data from Sprawl-Busters, an anti Wal-Mart organization that has been collecting the news about anti big-box store protests from various sources since 1998[iii]. From the Sprawl-Busters database, we selected all the protests that targeted at Wal-Mart's store proposals from 1998 to 2005. We also collected reports of protests from other activists' websites. A protest against a proposed Wal-Mart store can be reported multiple times, and we coded the multiple reports as one protest as long as they were targeted at the same store proposal. Third, we conducted a media search for reports about Wal-Mart's store proposals and protests from 1998 to 2005 using the Lexis-Nexis and the America's News database. Finally, we matched the data of proposed stores and protests obtained from the three sources and dropped the duplicated cases. In total, Wal-Mart made 1599 new store proposals in 1207 places, 563 of which saw protests, and 1040 ultimately resulted in store openings.

The multiple sources of our data, including the representations of Wal-Mart, protestors and the media, mitigate the concern about selection bias that would loom large if we relied on only one source. Confirming the comprehensiveness of coverage, we find that over 90% of proposed stores either result in actual openings or appear in at least two sources we used. Moreover, our results remain substantially the same if we drop the proposals without multi-source confirmation.

Dependent Variable and Estimation

Protests happened in a variety of forms, including rally and demonstration, requiring public hearings, collecting citizens' signatures to initiate petition, requiring studies of Wal-Mart's impact on local businesses, traffic and environment, highlighting environmental hazards, deploying zoning restrictions, lobbying for store-size cap legislations, and filing lawsuits against Wal-Mart or local government.

In estimating the factors that influence the incidence of protests, we faced a sample selection problem because protests can only be observed in places where Wal-Mart proposed to open new stores. It is unlikely that Wal-Mart randomly chooses to propose. Instead, Wal-Mart is likely to consider the size of local market, economic conditions, transportation costs, even potential resistance. Thus, naïve estimation without correcting the potential sample selection problem may create estimation bias. To address the concern, we adopted the Heckman two-stage probit model that accounts for the sample selection problem through estimating a selection effect coefficient (called the inverse Mills ratio) in a first-stage probit model and then adding the coefficient as a control to a second-stage model. The Heckman probit model is a variation of the original Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979) to analyze binary dependent variables. To conduct the first-stage probit model, we collected additional data from 1998 to 2005 about all American places where Wal-Mart could have made store proposals. We predicted the likelihood that Wal-Mart actually proposed to open a store in a place in a year by using the place's natural-log-transformed population, median household income, and distance to the nearest Wal-Mart's distribution center, the percentage of union membership in the private employment sector in the state, and calendar year as explaining variables. In the second stage, we estimated a Probit model of protests by controlling the sample selection coefficient, including all independent and control variables, and reporting geographically clustered robust standard errors.

Independent and Control Variables

To test the effect of racial diversity, we measured *racial homogeneity* using a Herfindahl index for each place i: $\sum_{i} \left(\frac{population_{ij}}{population_i} \right)^2$, where j represents either of the following six race groups, White, Black, Hispanics, Asian, Native Indian, and others. The data of racial composition in each place was collected from the 2000 Population Census.

To test the effect of historical monuments, we created a variable that measures *the log-transformed geographical distance to the closest historical landmark*. We first obtained a list of national historical landmarks from the website of the National Park Service (http://www.nps.gov/nhl/). We then obtained the longitude and latitude of these landmarks from the website of Wikipedia. For those the latitude and longitude of which are not listed on Wikipedia, we used the coordinate of the center of their location place from the Census of 2000. We then calculated the distance using the following formula, distance=3437*acos(sin(latA)*sin(latB)+cos(latA)*cos(latB)*cos(longA-longB)), where A refers to a place and B refers to a historical landmark. The unit of the distance is one mile.

We used a number of controls. We first controlled *the population size, unemployment rate, income per capita, and the percentage of urban population* in a place. We controlled the *migration* level in a place by including the percentage of a county's population over 5 years old in 2000 that had a residence in a different county five years ago. All these data were collected from the 2000 Population Census.

We measured a place's *Pro Democrat* political orientation using the county-level vote margins of those supporting Democrat presidential candidate over those supporting Republican candidate during the nearest past presidential election. We included a variable to control the *hazard of institutional escalation* by including a dummy variable that indicates whether an enacted legislation that restrains store size exists elsewhere within the same state in the prior year. We collected the data about the municipal-level store size legislation from the Institute for Local Self-Reliance.

We controlled the contagion effect of *protests in nearby communities* by including the count of prior protests weighted by geographical distance. Besides, we tried a variety of other variables to define protests in nearby communities, like protests within the same SMA area, within 100 miles, or within 200 miles. We also tried to weight these variables by the effect of time decay (i.e., decay by days or only count those protests within the past 365 days). All these variables are highly correlated and

generate similar results. Thus, we report only the result of the prior protests weighted by geographical distance.

We created a dummy variable to indicate if a place is enrolled with the *Main Street Program* in a year. The Main Street Program is a national nonprofit organization that aims at organizing the community-based training, guidance, and support to revitalize the traditional commercial district. The program was initially developed by the National Trust in the late 1970s and has since then developed into a national program enrolling more than 1,200 communities in 35 states. We obtained the data about the Main Street Program's local branches from its membership directories and the state-level Main Street Program offices.

A set of variables about a place's retail economy are also included. We measured the percentage of civil labor force employed in *the retail sector* using the data from the Census of 2000. We also controlled the state-level count of stores that are affiliated with *Wal-Mart's two major competitors*, Target and K-Mart, lagged by one year. The data were collected from Target and K-Mart's annual reports as well as K-Mart store closing lists before and after its bankruptcy.

We controlled two other variables that are possibly related to the organization of protests. The first is the density of *union* measured by the percentage of workers that are union members in a state's private sectors in the previous year. The union data were obtained from the Current Population Survey. The second is the number of *churches per capita* in a county in 2000, collected from the Association of Religion Data Archives.

We created two variables to control the characteristics of local governments. One is the *government's debt per capita*, measured by the total outstanding debt of a county government divided by the county's population. The data were collected from Census of Government in 1997 and 2002. The other is the structure of local government. We created a dummy variable, *city manager*, to indicate whether a local government adopts the council-manager form of government (for contrast is the

mayor-council form of government). The data were collected from the Municipal Yearbook and local governments' websites.

We controlled the influence of *media's attention* on anti Wal-Mart protests using two variables. One is the ln-transformed annual count of editorials with "Wal-Mart" as a key word, lagged by one year[iv]. The other is the annual percentage of editorials discussing *unfavorable topics* about Wal-Mart[v]. The data were collected from the America's News database. Finally, we controlled the year of a proposal. Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics.

<u>Insert Table 1-2 about here</u>

RESULTS

Table 2 displays the results of the incidence of anti Wal-Mart protests using the Heckman probit model. Model 1 includes only control variables. Protests are more likely to happen where the Democratic Party receives more supports (b=0.441, b<.05) and where there is a high migration rate of population (b=1.939, p<.01) and a city-manager form of local government (b=0.159, p<.05). The high hazard of institutional escalation has a significant positive effect on the incidence of protests (b=0.199, p<.05). Finally, protests are also more likely to happen when the media put more scrutiny on Wal-Mart (b=0.347, p<.01).

Model 2 tests the impact of race homogeneity on the incidence of protests. We find that race homogeneity is positively related to a place's likelihood to protest (b=0.737, p<.01), supporting the view that homogeneity facilitates mobilization. If a place's race homogeneity increases from the one standard deviation below the mean level to one standard deviation above, the probability of protest increases from 24% to 33% when holding every other variables at their means. Moreover, the coefficient of the distance to historical monuments also turned significant (b=-0.054, p<.05), showing that the further away a place from a historical monument, the lower the chance of a protest and

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confirming that proximity to historical sites is an important source of local pride and identity and boosts the chance of mobilization.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Big business organizations have become one of the most important features of American social landscape (Perrow, 2002). More and more, big firms have come to constitute societies in themselves, expanding their bureaucratic and hierarchical forms to guide the patterns of social exchanges. As big business organizations penetrate and constitute the basic social fabric, they have increasingly become the targets of social movement activists who seek to address social problems (Davis et al., 2005; King and Soule, 2007; Baron and Diermeier, 2008). Moreover, activists have recognized that business targets are more responsive to external pressures than political targets such as the state or legislatures. As a result, activists are quickly developing and testing their repertoires for contesting private organizations.

Our results show that the ability of activists to launch protests hinges on community identity. Communities that are composed of a racially homogeneous population and that have local pride and attachments experience a significantly higher chance of mobilization than others. Regarding social demographic diversity, researchers have been debating whether homogeneity or heterogeneity will facilitate mobilization. The debate is centered on whether the resources associated with diversity would compensate for the loss of cohesion. In our research context, most anti Wal-Mart protests are small-scale local events. Most of forms of protest that local activists engaged in are generally not very resource-consuming. However, as we argued in the theory, the expansion of Wal-Mart is highly controversial in the U.S., and besides protestors, there is a substantial proportion of the population who either enthusiastically support or at least sympathize Wal-Mart. Thus racial diversity is not only

likely to dilute the 'we-feeling' but also associated with conflicts of interests, and thus dampens the incidence of protests.

Regarding local pride and attachments, we find that communities close to historical landmarks are more successful in their mobilization efforts. The social identity literature suggests that the *uniqueness* and *positivity* of a group attract individuals to self-categorize themselves as affiliating with the group, as people gain a distinct sense of positive self-esteem from their identity groups, which furthers a sense of community and belonging (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Historical sites are an imporant factor in building community identity and pride. For example, Ingram and Inman (1996) found that the battlefield of the War of 1812 was strategically employed by institutional entrepreneurs to activate the national identity of local businessmen and to motivate them to engage into collective actions. Similarly, a recent proposal by Wal-Mart to build a store in Orange county of Virginia inspired intensive protests that drew national attention, because of its closeness to the Wilderness Battlefield of the Civil War (Yahoo, 2009).

Our results also indicate that the incidence of anti-Wal-Mart protests shows a clear sensitivity to local political ideology and that communities where liberal ideology is prevalent are more likely to spark the protests against the entrance of big businesses. This finding is consistent with the previous work that finds that the anti-business political ideology slowed the deregulation of interstate banking (Kroszner and Strahan, 1999). Together, these findings provide further support for social movement theorists' proposals that external political atmospheres tip the power balance between activists and their target (McAdams, 1995) and that activists' claims gain resonance where they are consistent with local dominant cultures and values (Bernstein, 1997).

Finally, our paper contributes to organizational theory by showing that movement activism is an important component of organizations' external environment. Our results as well as the findings of other recent works suggest that activists may not work alone to exert influence but, instead, they often

collaborate with the media, the legislative institutes, or other stakeholders. As social movement activists have increasingly target business organizations, a task for organizational theorists is to further explore the mechanisms that influence the interaction between social movement activists and business organizations.

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Figure 1. The Number of Wal-Mart Stores in the U. S. 1962-2008

Source: Wal-Mart Annual Reports

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Protest Incidence

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Population (100,000)	1.490	3.923	0.001	81.782
Unemployment %	0.059	0.031	0	0.417
Urban %	0.946	0.179	0	1
Income per capita ($1000)	20.739	6.278	5.377	109.219
Wal-Mart's competitors (100)	1.204	1.053	0	4.4
Migration %	0.224	0.074	0.065	0.540
Union density	0.126	0.060	0.028	0.269
Church per capita (%)	0.093	0.058	0.035	0.449
Retail worker %	0.117	0.023	0.034	0.283
Gov. debt per capita	3.320	3.935	0.112	112.383
Main Street Program	0.126	0.332	0	1
Editorial	4.271	0.815	3.497	5.765
Unfavorable editorial %	0.435	0.081	0.351	0.619
Year	2001.712	2.330	1998	2005
City manager	0.568	0.495	0	1
Pro Democrat	-0.044	0.224	-0.744	0.798
Race homogeneity	0.683	0.193	0.230	0.998
Distance weighted success	2.086	1.658	0.000	9.469
Protest	0.352	0.478	0	1
Political hazard	0.316	0.465	0	1
Log Distance to historical monument	2.17	1.12	-4.42	4.80

N=1599

Table 2. Heckman Probit Analysis on Protest Incidence

	(1)	(2)
Population	0.008	0.009
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Unemployment rate	0.032	0.849
	(1.313)	(1.353)
Income per capita	-0.000	-0.004
	(0.006)	(0.007)
Urban %	-0.007	-0.056
	(0.205)	(0.208)
Migration %	1.939***	2.100***
	(0.529)	(0.537)
Retail worker %	-1.405	-2.630
	(1.580)	(1.664)
Walmart's competitors	-0.023	0.003
	(0.037)	(0.039)
Union member %	0.128	-0.261
	(0.675)	(0.697)
Church per capita	0.566	0.214
	(0.765)	(0.785)
Debt per capita	-0.020	-0.020
	(0.014)	(0.014)
City manager	0.159**	0.154**
	(0.070)	(0.071)
Total editorial	0.347***	0.357***
	(0.105)	(0.106)
Unfavorable editorial %	0.014	-0.027
	(0.630)	(0.637)
Year	-0.030	-0.031
	(0.045)	(0.045)
Pro Democrat	0.441**	0.505***
	(0.184)	(0.188)
Distance weighted success	0.055	0.051
	(0.033)	(0.034)
Main street program	0.116	0.144
	(0.101)	(0.103)
Political hazard	0.199**	0.203**
	(0.081)	(0.082)
Distance to historical monuments	-0.046	-0.054**
	(0.032)	(0.033)
Race homogeneity		0.737***
		(0.271)
Constant	56.975	59.442
	(89.832)	(90.830)
N	1599	1599
Log lik.	-7998.683	-7993.908
Chi-squared	128.018	133.661

Standard errors in parentheses
** $p<.05$, *** $p<.01$ (two-sided test for control variables and one-sided test for hypothesized variables)

[i] New store proposals include the proposed discount stores and supercenters. A relocated store (i.e., relocating an existing store to the nearby area) is not counted as a new store. We started from the year 1998 because the Sprawl-Buster database began to collect anti Wal-Mart protest data from 1998. We ended our observation in 2005 because we need a time interval of at least two years to determine whether a proposed store was successfully opened.

[ii] This data was published by Wal-Mart Inc. on its website and then removed. We thank Panle Jia for generously sharing the data with us. This dataset can also be downloaded from http://www.econ.umn.edu/~holmes/data/WalMart/index.html.

[iii] Sprawl-Busters has been collecting the information of anti big-box store protests from a variety of sources, including media reports, governments' information releases, court results, independent institutions' research reports, and the activists' self-reports.

[iv] We chose to use editorials rather than the total number of newspaper reports because editorials reflects media's attitude and less likely to be a function of on-going protests.

[v] Negative events include anti union, low wage, gender discrimination, race discrimination, poor health care plan, exploit supplier, sweat shops, destroy community, destroy local business, and destroy job.