INTERNAL STATUS SORTING IN GROUPS: THE PROBLEM OF TOO MANY STARS

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ABSTRACT

Social and task groups need a few high-status members who can be leaders and trend setters, and many more lower-status members who can follow and contribute work without challenging the group's direction (Caporael (1997). Personality and Social Psychology Review, 1, 276–298; Caporael & Baron (1997). In: J. Simpson, & D. Kenrick (Eds), Evolutionary social psychology (pp. 317–343). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum; Brewer (1997). In: C. McGarty, & S.A. Haslam (Eds), The message of social psychology: Perspectives on mind in society (pp. 54–62). Malden, MA: Blackwell). When groups come together without a priori status differentiation, a status hierarchy must be implemented; however, if the new members are too homogeneously status seeking, then it is not clear what will result. We argue that hierarchy will develop even in uniformly status-seeking groups, and that the social context and members' relational characteristics – specifically, the degree to which they are group oriented rather than self-serving – will predict which status seekers succeed in gaining status. We discuss why and how a ''status sorting''

process will occur to award status to a few members and withhold it from most, and the consequences of this process for those who are sorted downward.

When people enter a new group, they carry expectations about the roles and status that they will occupy. In many cases, these prior expectations may be a problem. Specifically, when too many entering members all expect to have higher status in the group, then what happens? Can all the members simply form a super status "dream team," or will the group instead find a way of sorting the members so that there is a range of member statuses?

In many modern groups, new members have some sense of what their status will be, even as they first enter the group. For example, when a new player is drafted by a major league baseball team, cues such as salary and press coverage communicate quite clearly how the player ranks among his teammates, at least according to management and outside observers. These cues suggest that the best players will have the highest status. But we can also argue that status will be determined according to group needs, and as such the individual's status may look very different when observed from within the group. On the baseball team, we might find that there is an extremely competent hitter who lacks social skills and has low status because he is not seen as a good "team player." The players themselves may grant status to another person who is more congenial.[1]

In other groups, it is not clear upon entry how much status an individual member will have. Among newly recruited classes of first-year associates in law firms and consulting firms, and students in MBA programs and other graduate programs,[2] there are often no differences in titles or overt cues such as salary. Even though diagnostic differences will likely exist, they may be on a number of different dimensions (one student receives more fellowship support; another went to a more prestigious school; a third has the most personal income) and it may be harder to combine these into a clear, unidimensional ranking of status. Groups that are new or ad hoc may be likely to lack clarity in how status will be assigned and who will hold it within the group. In these settings, members must negotiate the rankings, implicitly or explicitly, in order to establish a status hierarchy.

This chapter is concerned with just such problems. When individuals, particularly those who seek or expect high status, join a group, the group must negotiate the internal process of assigning or withholding status. What happens in a group without a formal status conferring mechanism when too

1 many members are status seeking? In the following pages, we will lay out an argument that groups "sort" members into different status levels in order to
3 achieve needed functional differentiation, and that this sorting process affects not only group effectiveness but also individual characteristics.
5   We are interested in both task-related and social status, because groups' internal status hierarchy may be based on either one, and we will not dis-
7 tinguish between these in the following discussion. However, we will focus on groups that are convened for the purpose of completing some task,
9 rather than purely social groups. Further, we are interested in groups whose members have at least some degree of interdependence in completing their
11 focal tasks. For this work to be relevant to groups and teams in work organizations, it is important to specify these characteristics.
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WHAT IS STATUS?

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Status characteristics theory (Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch, 1972; Berger,
19 Ridgeway, Fisek, & Norman, 1998) holds that status is a marker of competence. That is, observers develop theories about characteristics that seem
21 to correspond to competence, and as a result begin to confer status on individuals who have those characteristics, even in the absence of evidence
23 of competence. This suggests that the highest status members of any group will be those who (a) display the most objective competence at valued tasks
25 (also known as achieved status) or (b) have characteristics that seem associated with competence (also known as ascribed status). Such character-
27 istics may often include being white, male, highly educated, from a privileged background, attractive, etc. As alluded to earlier, status (and, by
29 extension, competence) could refer to either task or social aspects of the group. Hogan and Hogan (2002) point out that the highest status leaders
31 must offer not only task competence, but also sociopolitical skill, suggesting that it might be difficult to disentangle how task and social competence
33 might be proxies for high status.
    An alternative view might equate status with referent power (French &
35 Raven, 1959), which is the status holder's personal magnetism and attrac- QA :1
tiveness to others, such that others want to affiliate with the status holder
37 and to emulate him or her. This view of status is descriptive and not as explanatory as status characteristics theory. However, it is a useful way to
39 conceive of status and lends itself to clean operational definition. For purposes of this discussion, we accept the framework of status characteristics

theory, but our use of "status" will refer more closely to others' desire to affiliate with, and assign leadership roles to, the status holder.

Our analysis of status in groups suggests that there must be differentiation within the group, at least on the status dimension (although the opening examples imply that status differences covary with other intragroup differences). This raises the issue of the role of heterogeneity within groups, which we will discuss next.

THE ROLE OF HOMOGENEITY AND HETEROGENEITY IN HUMAN GROUPS

A great number of column inches have been devoted to the question of how diversity affects group function. There is no clear answer; however, the bulk of evidence suggests that groups perform better on creative and performance tasks if there is substantial heterogeneity with respect to skills and functional backgrounds. If a work group consists of too many members with identical, limited skill sets, then the group cannot respond to situations that require different skills. On the other hand, homogeneity in affiliative qualities such as attitudes and demography (age, social background, ethnicity) lead to more harmonious, cohesive, satisfied groups (Jackson, 1982; O'Connor, Gruenfeld, & McGrath, 1993; O'Reilly, Williams, & Barsade, 1998).

In the current work, we are concerned with homogeneity and heterogeneity of *roles* and *status* within the group. *Roles* are informal positions associated with particular functions and responsibilities, and though they are conceptually distinct from status, in practical terms roles will tend to covary with status to such an extent that we will treat the two concepts as yoked for the following discussion.

Successful group functioning appears to require heterogeneity of intragroup roles. Caporael (1997), Caporael and Baron (1997), Brewer (1997), and Wilson (1997) have all argued that, throughout our evolutionary history, groups' structure and internal differentiation have been vital to basic survival as well as to higher-level coordinated activities. In order for needs to be met, there must be someone in the group who can handle any necessary function (historically – providing food, locating shelter, producing clothing, healing illness, raising children) and a reasonable chain of command for making decisions and resolving disputes. These requirements clearly point to the desirability of role heterogeneity. To return to the baseball team example, where would the New York Yankees be with a dugout

full of star catchers and no pitcher. As implied by the need for a chain of command, heterogeneity itself might not be enough; the group probably needs at least a nominal hierarchy in order to best coordinate its activities.

IS HIERARCHY INEVITABLE?

Throughout human history and across all societies, social systems have tended to order groups according to differential status, providing unequal access to resources and rewards, and inevitably giving rise to both privileged, hegemonic groups and disadvantaged "negative reference groups" (Sidanius & Pratto, 1993). Social scientists have argued that such intergroup hierarchical organization is adaptive, or at least rational, because it can allow the protection of a successful group's resources (Allport, 1958; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1958).

Somewhat less emphasized has been the likely fact that *within*-group hierarchy – by which we mean the differential valuing of individual members and the resulting ordinal ranking of these members along status lines – is also adaptive in its facilitation of individual coordination and mobilization. As Sidanius and Pratto (1993) point out, there are compelling reasons for hierarchy to be an adaptive feature of group development. Hierarchy can facilitate unequal distribution of resources, which by concentrating necessities in the hands of only a few, privileged members can maximize chances of group (though not individual) survival during times of scarcity. Those favored are likely to be group leaders, and others with valued skills. Paleolithic groups, for example, might have given priority resources to tribal leaders, shamans, and the most skilled hunters. On baseball teams, the highest salaries go to the players expected to contribute most to team wins. In all cases, these are people whose skills and positions are believed to be helpful to the larger survival of the group. Therefore, ensuring their survival may go further toward preserving the group (in some cases, even toward helping more individuals) than would assigning resources to lower-status members. Hierarchy can also preserve domestic tranquility by enforcing norms of obedience and subservience among low-status group members (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Finally, it can contribute to better military organization, which has been vital for the survival of living groups, as well as political and commercial groups in competitive environments.

For a group to succeed, individual members must be able to subjugate their own personal needs and desires to maximize the collective good (Hogan & Hogan, 2002). We believe that a "dream team" is unlikely to result

1   when there are multiple status seekers. For one thing, the authors cannot
    generate a valid example of a flat, egalitarian group of homogeneously high-
3   status members that does not develop hierarchy over time. More important,
    it seems probable that groups cannot accommodate too many status seekers
5   because a substantial number of people are needed to follow, to carry out
    more menial tasks, and to serve the group without too much independent
7   thought. A follower who is too self-starting might disrupt the coherent
    functioning of the group as a whole.
9   At the same time, groups do need some people to occupy top roles. High-
    status members of the group may set the agenda of the collective, so that the
11 group does not flounder in the complete absence of guidance (Brewer, 1997).
    When coordination is critical, the role of the leader may actually necessitate
13 the very characteristics of independent thought and self-direction that, when
    manifested in subordinates, interfere with group functioning.
15   All of this suggests that groups will have an interest in establishing and
    maintaining hierarchy, if only because members predisposed to want or
17 expect high status will try to acquire it. They will do this partly because of
    their individual motivations, and partly because the group as a whole will
19 begin to exert influence on members to differentiate and to coordinate ef-
    fort, and these status seekers will find it most comfortable to have high-
21 status positions that afford control and autonomy.
       Having argued for inevitability, though, it must still be acknowledged that
23 hierarchies may be more or less rigid and vertically differentiated. Organ-
    izations try to institute "flat" structures and populations such as college
25 undergraduates are particularly known for striving for social egalitarianism
    rather than stratification. Our arguments focus on status hierarchies with
27 relatively strong vertical differentiation.

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GROUP FEATURES THAT FACILITATE HIERARCHY
33   DEVELOPMENT

35 We will argue that individual characteristics are important in determining
    how group members will strive for status within the group, and who suc-
37 ceeds in winning that status. Afterwards, we will present several ideas about
    how the sorting process might occur. First, however, we present character-
39 istics of the group itself that may offer insight into which *groups* will es-
    tablish the most vertically differentiated hierarchies.

1 *Social Integration*

3 A group that is particularly ''group-y'' is said to have highly social inte-
gration (Moreland, 1987). Groups can vary on this dimension, from loose
5 assemblages of individuals who share physical proximity, but not identity or
purpose (e.g., a crowd on a subway) to tightly woven groups such as fam-
7 ilies, fraternities, or even cults. The term *entitativity* (Campbell, 1958; Ham-
ilton & Sherman, 1996) refers to a perceiver's sense of the group's social
9 integration, and is determined by the degree of perceived similarity and
common fate among members (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Lickel et al.,
11 2000). A good metaphor for a highly integrated, or entitative group is the
individual human being, made up of multiple unique components (organs)
13 that each provide a discrete function, but that are highly interdependent,
and whose combination is so integrated and coherent as to present the face
15 of a single entity.
    To the extent that entitativity and social integration are simply actor
17 observer perspectives on the same group quality, we might expect that
groups made up of very similar individuals with a high degree of common
19 fate will be the most integrated. However, to revisit our discussion of ho-
mogeneity, it is likely that such groups are similar on *affiliative* character-
21 istics. The cohesiveness resulting from affiliative similarity will benefit
certain aspects of group functioning, such as satisfaction and harmony. In
23 order to function smoothly, the group will also need good coordination, and
this will require clearer vertical differentiation on the status dimension.
25 We expect that groups with good social integration (affiliative similarity
and a sense of common fate) will both need, and be able, to establish ver-
27 tically differentiated status hierarchies more than less-integrated groups.
This may seem counterintuitive because such groups' natural affiliation
29 could be expected to lead to a more egalitarian system. However, in less-
entitative groups, the group is not as tightly woven and members can be
31 more independent, each can do his or her own thing. Though the group
might benefit from hierarchical organization, the group is not in a position
33 to enforce it. On the other hand, more entitative, ''group-y'' groups should
be better able to exert influence on members. This influence should allow
35 groups to ensure that members embody needed traits and skills and do not
display harmful or superfluous qualities. As a result, highly entitative groups
37 should be more able to ensure that they achieve proper intragroup differ-
entiation with respect to status. This differentiation should, in turn, yield
39 better group functioning and performance.

Tightness

It may appear paradoxical to suggest that homogeneity is related to greater intragroup hierarchy. However, evidence at the cultural level suggests that this may indeed be the case. The term *tightness* (Triandis, 1989) describes cultures in which stringent norms are imposed on individuals, and thus the range of acceptable behaviors is narrow. Tight cultures tend to be quite homogeneous, not only behaviorally but also demographically. A proto-typical tight culture is Japan, a homogeneous country in which conformity is highly prized – as evidenced by the common saying, ''The nail that stands up gets pounded down.'' Japan is also known as a strongly hierarchical country in which ranks are clearly identified and understood, and social mobility is low (Benedict, 1946; Triandis, 1989).

Whereas very tight cultures – Japan, Greece, and even rural America – are marked by high degrees of hierarchy and a clearly defined social order, in looser cultures – urban U.S., western Europe – the social structure tends to be (or appears to be) more egalitarian. Thus, we might expect that tight groups may also develop more polarized hierarchies. Certainly, in order to achieve functional differentiation, it should be necessary for these groups to develop hierarchy. It is even possible, that this hierarchy may be more marked in homogeneous than heterogeneous groups, which contain preexisting diversity and have less need to sort out members on the status dimension.

The concepts of entitativity, tightness, and intragroup hierarchy converge to predict that groups may need to subordinate certain individual behaviors and expressions in order to provide the benefits on which members depend. If the prehistoric group was to facilitate members' survival – and if the modern group is to facilitate members' achieving group goals – then the individuals in the group must function as a coordinated entity. Hierarchy is important to the functioning of a group, and the ability to force members to occupy the various roles in the hierarchy is determined at least in part by the degree of entitativity in the group. Given that individual human beings are notoriously likely to have different traits, preferences, work styles, and priorities, group coordination cannot be taken for granted. However, as our continued presence on the planet attests, human beings have clearly developed adaptive systems that facilitated our coordination in group settings.[3]

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WHO ARE THE STATUS SEEKERS?

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The character of our prototypical status seeker consists of high levels of trait self-esteem and self-efficacy, and an internal locus of control. It is important
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to note the strong element of self-determination implied by these traits. The dimensions of internal locus of control (Rotter, 1966) and self-efficacy
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(Bandura, 1986) represent an individual's belief in his or her own potency, competence and ability to control outcomes. Self-esteem has been charac-
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terized as a two-factor construct, gauging (similar) feelings of efficacy on the one hand, and self-liking on the other (Tafarodi & Swann, 1995). There
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clearly exists a great deal of overlap between these constructs, both con-ceptually and empirically. Measures of the constructs generally correlate
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with one another (Sherer, 1982; Stanley & Murphy, 1997), and Judge, Erez, Bono, and Thoresen (2002) argue that these dimensions are described well
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by a single construct.

Collectively, these traits seem to predict a cluster of self-relevant be-
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haviors (Judge et al., 2002). People with high self-esteem (HSE), high self-efficacy and a belief in internal control, for example, are all more likely than
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others to persevere on a given task (Shrauger & Sorman, 1977; McFarlin, Baumeister, & Blascovich, 1984; Bandura, 1992; Di Paula & Campbell,
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2002), and both esteem and efficacy are negatively related to "behavioral plasticity," or a willingness to yield, in response to social pressure (Janis,
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1954; Hjelle & Clouser, 1970; Brockner, 1979; Sandelands, Brockner, & Glynn, 1988). Individuals high in esteem or efficacy also tend to take credit
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for success and deny responsibility for failure, consistent with a belief in their virtue and ability (Bandura, 1992; Blaine & Crocker, 1993). The re-
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search, then, seems to converge to predict that self-esteem, self-efficacy, and internal locus of control should form a constellation of traits that indicate
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status seeking in an individual.

Higher levels of self-esteem, dominance, and self-efficacy not only predict
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emergent leadership (Atwater, Dionne, & Avolio, 1999; Smith & Foti, 1998; but see Chemers, Watson, & May, 2000), but are also associated with dis-
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satisfaction when leadership is withheld (Elangovan & Xie, 1999). Elango-van and Xie report that people with high, but not low self-esteem (and
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internal, but not external, locus of control) experienced stress and decreased motivation under the direction of a dominant supervisor.
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In line with these findings, Sidanius and Pratto (1993) predict that status and trait self-esteem should be positively correlated. These authors speculate
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that the relationship emerges because downward social comparisons are

1   more frequently available to high-status group members, but more simply, it
    is likely that status seekers (HSE individuals) pursue and gain high status
3   more often than do others. Relatedly, both dominance theory (Barkow,
    1980) and sociometer theory (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995) hold
5   that state self-esteem functions as a monitoring system to give the individual
    feedback about his or her standing (in the one theory, on dominance di-
7   mensions; in the other, on sociability dimensions) in social groups. Those
    whose status begins to slip should experience a hit to their self-esteem.
9   When a new group comes together, we would expect that members' self-
    esteem – and thus status seeking – should vary widely. But this is not always
11 the case. For example, new classes of MBA students are specifically selected
    to consist of people who have been high achieving throughout their lives,
13 and so this group probably has both HSE and less variable self-esteem than
    the average group. This is the situation of particular interest for this paper.
15 When such a group of uniformly status-seeking members comes together,
    can they all end up having high status? If not what will determine who
17 succeeds?

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WHO ARE THE STATUS WINNERS?

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    Accounts for who will emerge with status commonly focus on individual
23 qualities of status seekers. Status characteristics theory, for example, states
    that certain demographic characteristics become associated with status in
25 the larger society (Berger et al., 1972). Being male, white, and wealthy all
    covary with control of valued resources, and thus signal competence; there-
27 fore, individuals who have these characteristics tend to be ascribed status.
    Other theories focus on personality traits, pointing to high extraversion and
29 low neuroticism as predictors of emergent status (Anderson, John, Keltner,
    & Kring, 2001). Finally, individual qualities such as attractiveness may be
31 associated with status (Dion, Berscheid, & Walster, 1972; Anderson et al.,
    2001).
33   Although these individual differences indeed tend to covary with status,
    these frameworks do not take into account the importance of the larger
35 social context in determining who will emerge with status. For example,
    such frameworks do not seem to accommodate the possibility that *all*
37 members of a group may have similar characteristics, and thus are unable to
    predict what will happen in a uniform group of status seekers. To find an
39 explanation that goes beyond individual traits, it seems important to con-
    sider *relational* characteristics as an important determinant of status. That

is, given that status is inherently a relational construct (it cannot exist in the absence of a group), then some status-relevant characteristics are probably embedded in intragroup relationships as well as in individuals' relational characteristics.

The prototypical status seeker's strong sense of self-determination is consistent with an independent self-construal (Singelis, 1994). People with independent self-construals generally do not define the self with respect to the social context; they emphasize their internal attributes and capacities, and set goals that involve their own desired outcomes. Within groups, their concern tends to be their own strategic position (Caporael, 1997). Those with interdependent self-construals, on the other hand, emphasize roles and relationships, and do not perceive the self as very separate from others. In groups, they tend to seek connectedness with others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Caporael, 1997). Individualistic Western cultures are associated both with higher levels of individual self-esteem and a stronger tendency toward independent self-construals, whereas collectivistic cultures tend toward low self-esteem and interdependence. However, because self-esteem and self-construal are distinct concepts, they should be expected to vary independently.

We expect that HSE in general predicts status seeking. When that is paired with an independent self-construal, then a *self-promoting* style should result. In short, individuals will follow their own direction and pursue their own goals, scanning the environment for opportunities and pursuing those opportunities according to their own internal compass. On the other hand, when HSE is paired with an interdependent self-construal, then the status seeker's style should reflect a more *group-oriented* tendency toward leadership.

This dichotomy is well represented in literature on leadership, negotiation, and interpersonal behavior. Foa and Foa (1974) conceive of human interactions as a series of processes of social exchange involving not only tangible goods but also relational resources. Two such exchangeable resources are status and love. Our self-promoting individual is one who withholds status, and possibly love, from others in order to hoard it for his or herself. A group-oriented individual might be more willing to provide both love and status to others.

The dual concern theory (Pruitt & Rubin, 1999), designed to account for conflict styles and approaches to negotiation, echoes this perspective in positing that individuals typically approach encounters with others with two orthogonal targets of concern: The self and one's own outcomes, and the other and his or her outcomes. Concern for one's self is associated with

1 resistance to yielding (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000). In a group
   setting, one of the things that members must do is yield to the collective,
3 particularly when it comes time to coordinate efforts in order to accomplish
   some task. Members who resist yielding are likely to interfere with smooth
5 functioning of the group and may be ostracized. However, it is also possible
   that these members become leaders as long as they pair their resistance to
7 yielding with concern for others.

    People who are high in self-esteem and independent self-construal are
9 likely to be high in concern for the self, and those with HSE and an in-
   terdependent self-construal are likely to be high in concern for others. The
11 distinction between these two kinds of orientations is captured in De Dreu's
   categories of *prosocial* (other-concerned) and *egoistic* (self- and not other-
13 concerned) negotiators (De Dreu et al., 2000). De Dreu and his colleagues
   argue that ''prosocial negotiators perceive the negotiation as a collaborative
15 game in which collective welfare is important; egoistic negotiators conceive
   of negotiation as a competitive game in which power and personal success is
17 key'' (p. 902). To the extent that members of a newly formed group may be
   seen to be ''negotiating'' the way the group will function and the relation-
19 ships among group members, this is a particularly apt theory to account for
   how individual predispositions may have to be altered in order to assure
21 proper group functioning. In general, egoistic members will jockey for high-
   status positions and roles. If that is difficult – because, for example, there are
23 many others also seeking status – then prosocial status seekers, with their
   more collaborative orientations, may have an easier time ascending than
25 their more self-promoting peers.

    Similarly, Hogan and Hogan (2002) analyze leadership as a process that
27 combines *getting along* with others in one's social group and *getting ahead* in
   terms of the status hierarchy of that group. To be a leader, to have the
29 highest status, one must combine the drive to get ahead with the ability to
   get along. Having the first capacity without the second results in ineffective
31 leadership and less potential for gaining status. Our self-promoters, and De
   Dreu's egoistic negotiators, are primarily concerned with getting ahead.
33 However, our group-oriented status seekers and De Dreu's prosocial ne-
   gotiators temper this ambition with attention toward getting along with
35 others in the group. It should not be surprising that other group members
   might be more willing to yield status to the person who values getting along.
37   Finally, from the standpoint of the individual predispositions to status
   that we have been discussing, it seems likely that an individual's ability to
39 gain status will depend on the predispositions of others in the group. For
   example, the opportunities may differ for a self-promoter surrounded by

other self-promoters, and for a self-promoter with others who are happy to yield status.

WHAT HAPPENS TO THE STATUS "LOSERS"?

The research suggests, quite logically, that individualists will tend to resist low-status positions. Status-seeking individuals are likely to balk when they are pressured to assume subordinate positions in a group. These individuals are likely to prefer to seek control, or at least autonomy, within the group context to avoid having to subordinate the self to group imperatives. For a group to overcome this resistance and establish internal differentiation, Caporael (1997) suggest that social structures pressure their members to change through a process of *downward causation* (Caporael & Baron, 1997; Caporael & Brewer, 1995). Pure individualism must give way to group-focused leadership for a few, and, for the rest, to lower status and at least a degree of compliance.

According to Caporael's (1997) theory of sociality, just as the characteristics of members help determine the nature of a group (upward causation), the group, once established, exerts a reciprocal influence over its members, reshaping their characteristics and interactions to facilitate collective goals (downward causation). By rewarding some behaviors and punishing others, members of the group, as a collective, gradually influence each other as individuals. Sociometer theory (Leary et al., 1995) provides tentative support for the principle of downward causation. Leary finds that a group member's state self-esteem (i.e., feelings of self-worth in the moment) tends to drop as he or she falls out of favor with comrades. He suggests that this drop in esteem serves as an intrapsychic warning to the individual, prompting changes in behavior in an effort to stave off possible exclusion and regain the acceptance of the group. The individual's desire to belong becomes, in essence, a tool for the group. The individual who fulfills his or her role within the group is rewarded with acceptance, and the deviant is ostracized. Although sociometer theory predicts that people will try to improve their standing, and thus their self-esteem, not everyone can succeed at doing so. Insofar as the sociometer works to *align* the member's position with feedback received from the group, it is largely consistent with the concept of downward causation. Drawing on Caporael, we suggest that an individual's long-term roles and relationships in the group, including status, will respond to group-based pressure.

Downward causation provides a means for groups to adapt to their environment. In spite of any inclination for independence among individual members, when cohesion and cooperation become critical, groups may exert pressure to establish internal structure, restrain would be status grabbers, and maximize their chances for success. In a military squad on patrol, for example, there may be a few scouts, several rear guards, but only one leader. Subordinates who attempt to subvert the group structure, potentially compromising the mission as well as, here, the lives of the individual members, are likely to encounter severe pressure to conform. Later, we will address more specifically how this process might affect downward-sorted members. First, we will present some empirical evidence to support ideas that we have laid out so far.

TOWARD A TEST OF THE FRAMEWORK

Overall, our framework yields the following general predictions:

1. In groups that come together without a priori status structure, individuals with HSE will have a predisposition to seek high status.
2. In general, these individuals are likely to be successful in achieving high status.
3. However, the ability of status seekers to achieve their goals will be moderated by the social context. Specifically, when too many status seekers are present within the group, sorting will occur, such that most will be pushed down into lower-status roles and positions.
4. Sorting will result in a more vertically differentiated hierarchy in highly entitative and/or tight groups.
5. Those who succeed in gaining status in these groups are likely to be more interdependent, group oriented, and high in concern for others.

Most of the predictions in this framework must await testing in future research. However, we have begun to explore some of our hypotheses in a longitudinal study of naturally occurring groups in which group structure emerges over time (Correll, Overbeck, & Park, 2003). The organization whose members we surveyed for this study is a national public service group that we will call Beacon. Beacon volunteers serve for 1 year in exchange for a nominal stipend. During that year, they are based in a central location and are assigned to teams of roughly 10–14 members. Teams may be sent all across the country, from Alaska to Florida, for 6-week terms, during which they work on projects ranging from Special Olympics to constructing

1 wooden fences. Between the 6-week terms, all teams return to the home base for organization that is, wide communications and exercises. Except for one
3 early term, an individual can expect to spend the entire year of service with the same 10–14 people, namely working, eating, socializing, and living to-
5 gether in an intensely group-oriented environment.

   At the start of data collection, group members had nearly zero acquaint-
7 ance. They completed three waves of questionnaires; questionnaires includ-ed self-reported self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965) and independent and
9 interdependent self-construal (Singelis, 1994), as well as social networks' items that assessed respondents' task and interpersonal contacts. Following
11 our argument, the self-esteem measure represents individuals' tendency to seek status. Self-construal reflects one's degree of other-orientation. We as-
13 sessed self-esteem and self-construal very early in the year; thus, these in-dividual propensity measures assess personal characteristics before group
15 influence could take hold. We assessed status at two times, first about 6 weeks (Time 2) into the service year, and next about 7 months later (Time 3),
17 near the end of the service year. The first measure was thus a very early assessment of group status, taken when the groups had had only a small
19 amount of prior interaction and time to establish a hierarchy. The second measure occurred after a great deal of time had passed, when the group's
21 hierarchy should be well-established.

   Social network data allow for various approaches to the calculation of
23 status (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). To best capture status according to our questions of interest, we opted to create a new index from the social net-
25 works data, as shown in the following equation:

27 $$\text{Index} = I^* \frac{I}{O}$$

29 where I is the number of incoming ties and O is the number of outgoing ties.

   For any focal individual, being listed by someone else constitutes an in-
31 coming tie, and listing others constitutes an outgoing tie.

   Presumably, the greater the number of incoming ties, the more valued
33 that focal person is by the group. As we conceptualize status as esteem or regard by other group members, it is likely that a member who has more
35 incoming than outgoing ties is more valued than one for whom both kinds of ties are equal. The proportion of incoming to outgoing ties (I/O) captures
37 the individual's unreciprocated, or asymmetrical, esteem.

   We expected that groups with too many status-seeking members would
39 find it necessary to produce more followers by sorting members' status downward; this should yield a pattern whereby high group mean self-es-

1 teem, especially if the group members were tightly clustered around that
   mean, leads to greater downward changes in status. To assess this, we ex-
3 amined change in status from Time 2 to Time 3 as a function of members'
   individual predispositions and the resulting composition of groups at Time
5 1.
       Consistent with our predictions, in the Beacon organization self-esteem
7 was associated with greater increases in status. In groups with many status-
   seeking members (i.e., those with relatively high average self-esteem), mem-
9 bers were only able to gain status if the group was relatively variable on self-
   esteem. That is, if status seeking was highly variable, then there was suf-
11 ficient "room" for status seekers to achieve their desired high status. How-
   ever, if *too many* members sought status, then on average members' status
13 declined over time. This suggests that the group was sorting members
   downward, as implied by our framework.
15   Further, individual interdependence predicted whether individuals would
   emerge with status in their group. Among groups low in status seeking
17 predispositions on average, individual interdependence had little effect on
   changes in status. Both independent and interdependent members of low
19 self-esteem groups had equivalent (and very slight) increases in status over
   time.
21   However, in HSE groups, interdependence had important influence, and
   that influence depended on group composition. In heterogeneous groups
23 (status seeking on average, but high in variability), the independent self-
   promoters were able to gain high status. It seems plausible that, in these
25 groups, there is less imperative for the group to exert downward influence
   because it is already sufficiently differentiated in terms of status seeking; the
27 self-promoters' pursuit of status gives them the necessary distinctiveness to
   succeed in obtaining it. On the other hand, in homogeneous status-seeking
29 groups, only those members high in interdependence were able to gain status
   within the group. To revisit an earlier discussion, in the homogeneous
31 groups all (or most) members are apparently concerned with obtaining high
   status. Unfortunately, not all of them can do so. The group must sort out
33 members along the status dimension. To succeed, members must have not
   only the concern for self to prompt seeking high status, but also sufficient
35 concern for others that the group will agree to yield status.
       When groups are in a position of having too many individuals predis-
37 posed to seek high-status positions within the group, these groups respond
   by sorting members downward. They suppress the status of some members,
39 relative to other members and to groups in which sorting does not need to
   occur. In these groups, the members who are sorted downward are more

1 likely to be both status seeking (high in self-esteem) and low in orientation
toward others in the group. This may be explained through the contrast
3 between self-serving and group-oriented status seekers. If all in my group
seek status, then probably only those who form alliances or otherwise enlist
5 others' support will succeed. It may be that only a competitor whom I
perceive as being concerned with my well-being can obtain my support in
7 gaining status; one who is too self-serving will be a greater threat than one
who gives something back for the status he or she gains.
9

11
HOW MIGHT STATUS SORTING OCCUR?
13
One question that arises when considering these findings is exactly how
15 groups go about sorting members. The sorting process may be explicit and
overt; on the other hand, it may be implicit and relatively automatic. Lit-
17 erature on hierarchy development suggests that the latter is more likely.
Explicit status sorting certainly does occur, but it seems more obviously
19 associated with *suppression* rather than development of hierarchy. In Israeli
kibbutzim, there is awareness that different work tasks carry different levels
21 of associated status. As the kibbutzim value egalitarianism and wish to
avoid developing hierarchies, members are rotated among different task
23 assignments whose status varies. In this way, no individual becomes per-
manently associated with the status carried by a certain assignment (Snarey
25 & Lydens, 1990). In other organizations, such as the design firm Ideo, sim-
ilar efforts to eliminate formal hierarchy are explicitly enacted (Crainer,
27 2001; Sutton, 2002). At Ideo, though individuals are hired into positions of
differential rank, the actual work process mandates that ad hoc teams be
29 brought together for each new project. On these teams, member rank is
consciously manipulated such that high-ranking employees take the lead
31 only on some projects, and are expected to be subordinate on others.
(However, as Sutton points out, even within this flattening structure, an
33 informal system of differential status develops based on performance on
projects and degree of adherence to the group norms.)
35 Implicit status sorting could occur through organizational processes such
as the presence or growth of an organizational culture. In addition, it has
37 been thought that the emergence of status hierarchy might be determined by
individual differences, that is, people with more valued status characteristics
39 may be more likely to emerge as high status within a group (Anderson et al.,
2001; Carli, 1991). However, for nascent groups such as those in Beacon, it

1   seems more likely that intragroup *interactions* give rise to hierarchy (see
    Ridgeway, Boyle, Kuipers, & Robinson, 1998).
3   A substantial literature in psychology, sociology, communication, and
    organizational behavior outlines how status becomes enacted through in-
5   teraction. Many of these accounts focus on the language and dialogue ex-
    change within the group. For example, hierarchies may develop because of
7   conversational dominance: Monopolizing the conversational ''floor,'' inter-
    rupting, taking disproportionate turns, making jokes (Robinson & Smith-
9   Lovin, 2001; Ridgeway et al., 1998; Shelly & Troyer, 2001; Schmid Mast,
    2001) or because the use of less polite, more direct language signals others
11 that the speaker is higher in status (Brown & Levenson, 1987; Fragale,
    Chapter 5, this volume; Ng & Bradac, 1993). In addition, studies of animals
13 focus on hierarchy developing processes such as asymmetrical gazing
    (McNelis & Boatright-Horowitz, 1998), dominance contests (Chase, 1980),
15 and facial expressions (De Waal, 1998).   QA :2
       One likely status sorting process involves interpersonal complementarity
17 on dominance-related dimensions. Interpersonal circumplex researchers
    show that people tend to respond to dominance or submission in a com-
19 plementary manner, whereas they respond to affiliative behaviors – (agree-
    ability or hostility) with like behaviors. Although much of social
21 psychological theory on interpersonal attraction holds that people are at-
    tracted to those similar to themselves, circumplex theory states that a more
23 important determinant of attraction is how well interaction partners facil-
    itate our own goals, a criterion that necessitates complementarity in terms of
25 dominance (Dryer & Horowitz, 1997; Tett & Murphy, 2002). Some work
    has shown that verbal patterns elicit complementary responding. For ex-
27 ample, Dryer and Horowitz assigned undergraduates to work in pairs and
    coded the complementarity of their behavior. The majority of experimental
29 dyads displayed complementarity in terms of verbal patterns such as advice
    giving or criticizing (dominance) and deferring or expressing self-doubt
31 (submissiveness). However, this pattern was not exceptionally strong. More
    importantly, across two studies, Dryer and Horowitz showed that verbal
33 responses that were complementary to one's own trait dominance or sub-
    mission led to greater liking for the interaction partner and greater satis-
35 faction with the interaction.
       Perhaps more powerful and pervasive, yet less obtrusive, is complement-
37 arity in physical behaviors. Tiedens and Fragale (2003) posed confederates
    and, in one study, participants in dominant (physically expanded) and sub-
39 missive (physically restricted) postures during interactions. Participants who
    were part of complementary interactions reported greater liking for their

interaction partners and greater comfort in the interactions. When only confederates were posed, participants rather quickly and automatically assumed complementary postures. That is, paired with a physically expanded partner, participants constricted their posture and vice versa. Tiedens and Fragale suggest that status differences may arise very early in an encounter when one interactant adopts a dominant posture, whether due to strategy or serendipity, and that the complementary, submissive response of the partner may set the tone for subsequent interactions.

If so, this suggests that one route through which groups sort members' status may be the postural balance of members, perhaps established very early in the life of the group. Those who comply with the first physical response expected of them (as a function of a partner's posture) will be liked and prized, and those who resist will be shunned. This suggests a "first mover" advantage in which status goes to the one who most promptly claims it. In homogeneous status-seeking groups, perhaps early physical displays of dominance (much like in a primate band, in fact) contribute to the marginalization of "uppity" status-seeking members.

It should also be noted that Chartrand and Bargh (1999) demonstrated that behavioral *mimicry*, rather than complementarity, led to greater liking and satisfaction. However, the behaviors mimicked in their studies either were irrelevant to dominance or reflected affiliation: They included rubbing one's face, shaking one's foot, and smiling. As Chartrand and Bargh argue, mimicry in these cases may serve the adaptive function of helping to establish unity, membership, and belonging (in short, social integration) between the interaction partners.

Within the scope of the ideas presented here, it is likely that both complementarity in dominance behaviors, and mimicry in affiliative and irrelevant behaviors serve the purpose of strengthening the group. Mimicry establishes a sense of coherence and entitativity, while complementarity creates internal stratification that allows functional differentiation and coordination. Both facilitate intragroup liking and satisfaction, as well as heightening members' sense of similarity to one another.

Finally, status sorting may occur as a function of information processing by group members. At the individual level, De Dreu and Boles (1998) found that negotiators who tended to be individualistic or competitive attended to information consistent with these orientations, and employed heuristics that implied consistent strategies. On the other hand, prosocial negotiators attended to more prosocial information and used prosocially oriented heuristics. This suggests that, upon entering the group, status-seeking members may selectively attend to information from other group members that sup-

1 ports their view of themselves as autonomous individuals, and disregard
information (including influence efforts) from group members eager to es-
3 tablish a more prosocial or collectivist environment. As other group mem-
bers participate in establishing a shared group meaning (e.g., Weick, 1996),
5 these self-concerned status seekers may find themselves marginalized by
clinging to rules of engagement not recognized by the rest of the group.
7   Cognitive processing at the *group* level can also effect sorting. Gruenfeld
and Hollingshead (1993) found that groups socially construct a group level
9 cognition that is largely convergent in nature. That is, group cognition in-
corporates and builds upon the individual cognitions of members, combin-
11 ing these cognitions into a larger whole superordinate to any one member's
thought. As individuals come together and work to reconcile and integrate
13 differing perspectives, some may be more represented than others in the final
group reality. Sorted status may either predict or result from the degree of
15 correspondence of a given member's cognitive contributions and the final
group cognition.
17

19

HOW DO SORTED INDIVIDUALS RESPOND?

23 Another important question involves how people respond to the pressure
exerted on them by their groups. One possibility is that status seekers denied
25 intragroup status simply resist being sorted – if given the opportunity to
exit, literally or through inaction, perhaps they take it. But in some envi-
27 ronments, like Beacon (and like the paleolithic contexts that the group ad-
aptation theories address), it is not possible (or at least, not very feasible) for
29 individual members either to depart the group or to sit on the sidelines
refusing to participate.
31   In groups without an exit option, we propose that individuals will ac-
quiesce to intragroup sorting. They will assume the lower status granted
33 them by fellow group members and they will comply with the group's re-
quirements for their behavior and contributions. If they do not do so, the
35 group will have difficulty meeting its goals, and therefore any resistance is
likely to be met with increased group pressure. Although it may seem as if
37 people would want to resist the aversive aspects of having low status, we
believe that the sorting process will create psychological changes in the
39 individual that may lessen the aversive experience of being sorted down-
ward.

SHIFTING FROM INDIVIDUAL- TO GROUP-BASED MODEL OF SELF

One potential benefit of status sorting is that it helps to reduce uncertainty for individuals as to their social regard and standing. Uncertainty reduction has been shown to be a powerful motivation for development of social identity (Hogg, 2000), and within-group status sorting is clearly a process that will enable group members to understand their "place" among their most frequent and important relationships. Although researchers have shown compellingly that the individual self-concept has motivational primacy – it is the most fundamental level of self-definition (Gaertner, Sedikides, & Graetz, 1999; Gaertner, Sedikides, Vevea, & Iuzzini, 2002) – it is also true that collective self-concepts exist (Triandis, 1989). That is, the model one holds of the self can be situated within the boundary defined not only by one's own skin, but also by one's group memberships and social categories.

We suggested earlier that a highly entitative group echoes the organization and functional unity of an individual person. Once a person becomes part of such an entitative group, then it should be fairly easy for his or her self-concept to accommodate not only the self that is a single organism, but also the new entity of which the person has become an interdependent part. In fact, just such a phenomenon has been well-documented in the social psychology literature on self-categorization theory and optimal distinctiveness (see Brewer, 1991; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Although one's awareness of the individual self should only be substantially *lessened* in the context of a very *extreme* group – for example, the Jonestown, Guyana, cult in the 1970s – it is likely that awareness of the collective, or group-based, self will *increase* dramatically when the individual spends time as a member of a highly entitative group.

This shift should have a number of consequences. For one, individuals may begin to feel less imperative to identify or change their in-group status as they begin to see the superordinate group as a more basic level of organizing their own social experience. That is, instead of looking outward from their own eyes at fellow group members, they and others may begin to look outward from the group's perspective at external actors. Thus, they may simultaneously begin to ignore intragroup differentiation, and to become attuned to intergroup relations.

Some evidence for the former process is found in the interpersonal complementarity literature, which shows that dyads who adopt complementary dominance behaviors and speech patterns actually begin to see each other as

1   more similar, even though their actions are objectively more distinct, relative
    to noncomplementary dyads. If this is true, then being sorted into a lower-
3   status role may not be aversive, because the status distinction may lose its
    salience for the sorted members.
5   As to orienting toward other groups, Caporael and Baron (1997) argue
    that intergroup differentiation may encourage acceptance of within-group
7   disadvantage by emphasizing the intergroup advantages (protection, re-
    sources, etc.) that can accrue to members. Similarly, Levin, Federico, Si-
9   danius, and Rabinowitz (2002) posit that individuals constrained by group
    status hierarchies, and thus unable to indulge their desires for higher status,
11 may turn their focus to intergroup relationships in order to satisfy those
    desires. Thus, again, status sorting may not be very aversive because the
13 focal distinctions in the social environment are intergroup rather than in-
    tragroup.
15   Finally, Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, and Sacchi (2002) demonstrated that
    making salient participants' mortality led them to feel more strongly aligned
17 with their groups, to judge their groups as more entitative, and to show
    more in-group favoritism. In line with our argument that groups are adap-
19 tive, these findings suggest that a functional, well-organized, entitative
    group buffers individuals from the fear of death. By placing more emphasis
21 on the collective aspects of the self-concept, individuals can not only benefit
    practically from group membership, but may even be able to improve their
23 sense of safety from death – after all, the group is likely to outlive any
    individual component. Though this may be more relevant to truly survival
25 oriented (e.g., prehistoric) groups, it does suggest a powerful incentive for
    individuals to acquiesce to group-assigned status.

27

29

CONSEQUENCES FOR INDIVIDUAL ATTRIBUTES

31

    Although not all groups will constitute as intense a collective experience for
33 individualistic Americans as Beacon, membership in a strong group should
    have consequences for the individual's attributes – that is, true downward
35 causation will occur, whereby the individual's enduring traits are changed
    after the group membership. These consequences should be particularly
37 strong in more integrated groups. We discussed possible changes in the
    representation of the self-concept, above. In addition, persons from a highly
39 individualistic culture who join a highly integrated group should experience
    other self-related changes.

Self-esteem

As most commonly measured in the U.S.A., self-esteem (cf., Rosenberg, 1965) is an individual level construct. Thus, when people with HSE join groups consisting of mainly HSE members, it is likely that their individual level self-esteem will decrease over time. (This is probably not true for those who did not face group sorting or for those members selected in their group to assume a leadership role, because their self-concept was not subject to change as a function of group membership.) On the other hand, group-based self-esteem will probably increase for these sorted individuals.

Self-construal

As a consequence of group membership, we expect that interdependent self-construals will increase, on average. In particular, HSE members who started out being independent and then were granted lower status should show substantial increases in interdependent self-construal. Such an individual would learn fairly quickly that he or she could not count on obtaining rewards and resources through his or her own capacities, given low standing in the group. Therefore, the individual's reliance on the group as a source of rewards would increase. This should be accompanied by an increased sense of common fate, which is an frequently identified component of entitativity (see Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Lickel et al., 2000) and therefore an enhanced sense of the group as figure rather than ground. The group would, as a consequence, be more central in the member's self-construal.

Attention

Members of a group should pay greater attention to stimuli of interest or importance to the group after spending time in and becoming acculturated to the group. This effect should be particularly strong for those who entered as self-promoters, whose attention was likely focused outward toward the environment, looking for opportunities for personal advancement. Two changes are likely to occur for these individuals. First, attention to intra-group affiliation should increase as the perceivers learn to tune in to interpersonal relationships within the group and contribute to smooth group interactions. Copeland (1994) showed that higher-status perceivers tended to focus attention on information that helped them evaluate others' com-

petence for completing important tasks, whereas lower-status perceivers' attention was directed toward the self, and presenting the self as likable and attractive. Copeland's work suggests that individuals who are sorted downward will be less likely to direct attention outward toward opportunities for reward, and instead will begin to attend more to the impressions that they are making on higher-status group members.

Second, attention to intergroup status should increase as the perceivers shift from concern about their position within the group (and find that they do not achieve a high position) to concern about their group's standing with respect to other groups (which, presumably, may still be high).

Models of Agency

Morris, Menon, and Ames (2001) argue that individualistic cultures are associated with implicit theories of agency that emphasize the efficacy of individual action; agency theories in collectivistic cultures, on the other hand, emphasize group action. We believe that self-promoters generally like to rely on themselves to "get things done." As they are sorted downward by their groups, they will begin to see the group as the locus of agency. Only in concert with others can things "get done," and the individual effort may be frustrated.

Simultaneously, at the personal level, another agency-related shift may occur. Snibbe and Markus (2002) discovered that Americans of low socioeconomic status (SES) seem to hold models of personal agency that differ from those in the middle and upper classes. Specifically, whereas higher-SES individuals generally perceive the concept of agency as reflecting their ability to engage the external environment and elicit a specific, desired reaction from that environment, members of the lower classes conceive of agency as simply protecting the integrity of the self (see Higgins, 1996). Paradoxically, as self-promoters become more acculturated in the group and more interdependent in their self-construals in the group, they may also shift their conception of personal agency away from "getting things done" toward protecting and maintaining their personal selfhood within the group context.

CONSEQUENCES FOR GROUP FUNCTIONING AND SATISFACTION

Well-sorted groups, in our view, feature appropriate differentiation and specialization among members, paired with sufficient hierarchy to allow for effective coordination of effort. A group sorted in this way should function better than groups that are insufficiently differentiated or that have too diffuse a status/authority structure. We have argued that members who were too similar on status seeking were detrimental to group functioning; indeed, much work on diversity in groups and teams holds that too homogeneous groups do not function well (Jackson, 1982; O'Connor et al., 1993; O'Reilly et al., 1998). Instead of similarity, we believe that the better metaphor for a successful group is the individual human being itself – composed of different, unique parts (whether physical or psychological) that nonetheless function in a unified, coherent manner. Such groups – and we predict that they will result from successful sorting of members – should enjoy the benefits of diversity in expertise and perspectives, as well as of homogeneity in concern for group welfare and cohesiveness.

Therefore, groups that are heterogeneous with respect to vertical status differentiation, either a priori or after sorting, should function better than more homogeneous groups. This may happen because the group has developed a sufficient chain of command to organize member activity; because the group's direction is more unified given that not too many individuals are tussling over setting that direction; or because the group's attention is focused outward to the external environment.

Along these lines, members of groups that have succeeded in sorting status aspirations should experience greater satisfaction on average, due to their similarity on affiliative dimensions, and perceived similarity as a result of complementarity on dominance dimensions. Further, being sufficiently differentiated on status should reduce uncertainty and give each group member a clearer sense of ''place'' in the group, both likely to lead to happiness and satisfaction. This should even extend to sorted down members, particularly, as we have argued, that their personal attributes and group orientations do change.

FINAL THOUGHTS

From a functional perspective, the ability to sort on status should serve groups well. We have argued that when there is heterogeneity in status-seeking tendencies, the establishment of vertical hierarchy within the groups is likely to proceed with ease. But when a group consists of a relatively homogeneous set of status seekers then a sorting process must ensue, sorting some group members upward in status and some down. Based on our data and theory we argue that under these circumstances, an interpersonal (as opposed to individualistic) orientation is likely to serve both the individual and the group well. A number of key psychological processes kick in to help the group member who is sorted downward adjust to and embrace his/her role in the group. As noted earlier, the majority of these postulates have yet to undergo rigorous empirical testing. But the data in hand supports the critical argument that groups with a strong concentration of HSE members those who are relatively homogeneous in their self-esteem, force group members to sort with respect to status. Moreover, group members with a stronger interpersonal orientation sort upwards, whereas those lower on this dimension sort downward.

Our view of the interplay between individuals – particularly, as we focus on the most headstrong, self-promoting individuals – and groups may strike some as a bit extreme. After all, most readers of this chapter are members of multiple groups, many that require a great deal of coordination from members who assume that we will each be a leader, a prized member, or at least a capable, autonomous unit. And most such readers probably feel that being "sorted downward" is an alien experience.

It is exactly the usual experience of ease in being an individualist in modern American society that prompts us to reexamine the importance of groups. Although most Americans can quite easily avoid joining any groups that refuse to grant us the status we feel we deserve, when we *do* find ourselves in such a compelling group environment, functionality should dictate that we respond adaptively by finding a way to structure the group that makes it maximally effective and efficient.

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NOTES

1. These task and social dimensions will not always correspond to the same internal–external perspectives. For example, an engineering division may establish its internal status rankings around who has the best technical skills, whereas higher-level managers who observe the division may be influenced more by the political and social skills of department staffers, and assign a different objective hierarchy (enacted through pay and privileges) than the staff itself experiences.

2. In several of these examples, the new group members have likely arrived after an extended "tournament" (Rosenbaum, 1979) in which they competed at successively narrowing levels to advance to a higher-status group. Stanford MBA students, for example, may have found that they were stars in high school, then arrived at a selective college as only one of many "stars." In order to advance, they had to stand out at the undergraduate level and then go on to be part of the smaller group selected by a prestigious employer; finally, they were selected from this group to join the even smaller group of MBA students at an elite program. This tournament model is not necessary to produce an "all-star" group with undifferentiated status and the imperative for sorting, but it is an excellent example of how such a need might arise.

3. It should be noted at this point that we have been focusing on groups that are interdependent with respect to group goals and objectives. There are certainly groups in which coherence and coordination of individual effort is not particularly necessary. For example, in brainstorming groups, it is quite effective for each individual member to work alone. At the end of the brainstorming period, individual products are simply pooled, and the greatest disjunctive set of brainstormed items constitutes the group product. This can be distinguished from a group with high task interdependence, in which not only outputs, but even inputs for a given individual are dependent on the work produced by another individual. Our arguments assume some degree of interdependence in the group.

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