

# Making a Positive Impression in a Negotiation: Gender Differences in Response to Impression Motivation

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## Keywords

gender, negotiation, stereotype threat, stereotype reactance, impression management, impression motivation.

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## Abstract

Prior research has demonstrated the phenomenon of *stereotype reactance*, whereby men and women behave in contrast to gender stereotypes, when those stereotypes are activated explicitly (Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001). The authors propose and present an experiment demonstrating a new mechanism for stereotype reactance—namely, *impression motivation*, or the degree to which people are motivated to control how others see them (Leary & Kowalski, 1990). Participants randomly assigned to represent either a high-status recruiter or a low-status job candidate engaged in a standard employment negotiation simulation. Half the participants were offered an additional incentive to make a positive impression on their negotiation counterparts. As hypothesized, men and women in the high-status role responded to impression motivation in a manner that contradicted gender stereotypes. Men responded to impression motivation by yielding value to their subordinates, whereas women responded by claiming value for themselves.

How do you negotiate when you need to make a positive impression? The answer may depend on your gender. Theorists argue that effective negotiation requires *both* advocating for self and advocating for others, but how do people manage this tension when gender stereotypes get in the way? Women are assumed to be warm and relational, which might represent a barrier to advocating for themselves, whereas men are assumed to be competitive, which might represent a barrier to advocating for others.

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This study examines how men and women go about making a positive impression in a negotiation. More specifically, we designed an experiment to test how *impression motivation*, or the degree to which people are motivated to control how others see them (Leary & Kowalski, 1990), leads to *stereotype reactance* (Kray et al., 2001). The findings are informed by theories of negotiation, gender, and stereotype threat, each of which is reviewed below.

## Negotiation: A Tension Between Self and Other

One of the most central and commonly held theories of negotiation is that the negotiation process involves a delicate balance between advocating for oneself and advocating for others. Walton and McKersie (1965) call this the “mixed-motive” nature of negotiation; Pruitt and Rubin (1986) call it the Dual Concern Model; Lax and Sebenius (1986) call it the Negotiator’s Dilemma. Mnookin, Peppet, and Tulumello (1996) offer an interpersonal perspective on the dilemma, arguing that negotiators must balance a tension between assertiveness (i.e., expressing and advocating one’s own interests) and empathy (i.e., demonstrating an understanding of the other side’s concerns). Negotiators who focus too much on themselves risk damage to their relationships (either through impasse or as a result of excessive coercion of their counterparts), whereas negotiators whose motivations are too relational risk poor economic outcomes (either as a result of exploitation by their counterparts or as a result of “leaving value on the table;” Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984; Curhan, Neale, Ross, & Rosencranz-Engelmann (in press); Fry, Firestone, & Williams, 1983).

Nearly all well-known negotiation theorists maintain that expert negotiators need to be capable of demonstrating *both* concern for self and concern for other. For example, Fisher, Ury, and Patton (1991) argue that negotiators need to “be hard on the problem [yet] soft on the people” (p. 54). Similarly, Mnookin et al. (1996) argue persuasively that “effective negotiators should be both empathetic and assertive” (p. 227).

In theory, there is no reason why one should not be able to negotiate with a focus on both the self and the other, but in practice, the presence of gender stereotypes may make this task more complicated. For example, a woman who advocates too strongly for herself risks being perceived as masculine (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Fiske, 1993; Rudman & Glick, 2001), whereas a man who advocates too strongly for others risks being perceived as feminine (Sirin, McCreary, & Mahalik, 2004). We turn next to a review of research on the content of gender stereotypes in organizational contexts like negotiation.

## Gender: A Tension Between Self-Promotion and Communion

Similar to the tension described by negotiation theorists between self and other, gender theorists argue that women in organizations face a tension between self-promotion and communion (Carli, 2001; Eagly & Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001; Jamieson, 1995; Ridgeway, 2001; Rudman, 1998). Although self-promotion may be necessary to achieve one’s instrumental objectives, or to project an impression of organizational competence, women who self-promote may violate the common gender stereotype that women are

communal (i.e., focused on others), thereby adversely affecting how they are perceived by others, and perhaps even their own future economic success (Rudman, 1998). Conversely, men may risk a loss of authority and/or respect if they are perceived as overly communal (a stereotypically feminine trait).

Recent research on gender differences in negotiation suggests that, in situations characterized by structural ambiguity (i.e., with few external comparison standards by which to gauge one's performance), men tend to outperform women (Bowles, Babcock, & McGinn, 2005). Many women report that they prefer to avoid negotiating whenever possible (Babcock & Laschever, 2003). When women do negotiate, they report feeling anxiety and discomfort (Barron, 2003; Wade, 2001), perhaps because they feel they must violate the prescriptive stereotype demanding that women be highly relational and interdependent.

## Stereotype Threat and Stereotype Reactance

One explanation for the impairment of negotiation performance by stereotypes can be found in the literature on *stereotype threat* (Steele & Aronson, 1995). When a group, such as women, is widely believed to have characteristics that predict low success on a task, such as negotiation, then any individual group member is likely to feel anxiety when trying to perform that task, particularly if the individual cares about performing well. In a compelling study, Kray et al. (2001) had men and women negotiate with one another concerning a simulated, single-issue transaction between a buyer and a seller. When the task was perceived as diagnostic of negotiating ability, or when the task was linked implicitly to gender-specific traits—such as being assertive, as opposed to accommodating—men outperformed women. Although they cared about their performance and hoped to do well, women claimed less value in the negotiation than did their male counterparts.

Fortunately, a very different pattern emerged when the researchers stated the stereotype *explicitly*—that is, saying that *women* tend to show traits associated with poorer negotiation performance (Kray et al., 2001). In this case, instead of confirming the stereotype, women showed *stereotype reactance*: they reacted against the stereotype content and, in fact, outperformed their male counterparts. When women have more power in negotiation, they are even more likely to display stereotype reactance in response to the explicit activation of gender stereotypes, perhaps because their greater power allows them to be more assertive (Kray, Reb, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2004). These findings suggest that, when women are thinking about their possible liabilities in a negotiation situation, they may be planning ways to compensate for and overcome them.

## Stereotype Reactance and Impression Management

In addition to arising from a highly salient reference to the stereotype, reactance may stem from concerns over impression management. Recently, von Hippel and colleagues (von Hippel et al., 2005) argued that members of stereotyped groups, when they are chronically concerned with impression management, may cope with stereotypes through a strategy of denial. Specifically, von Hippel et al. demonstrated that impression management concerns led to the denial of status-, age-, or race-related stereotypes; that is,

participants experiencing stereotype threat verbally denied doubts about their competence, over-reported their intelligence, or denigrated the importance of a task on which they experienced threat. However, von Hippel et al. measured impression management in domains (e.g., math performance) in which it would be difficult for reactance to manifest in participants' performance. Although they may have railed against the stereotypes, participants probably found it difficult to display greater math ability or intelligence.

Based on these results, we expected that manipulating negotiators' incentives to make a positive impression on their counterparts—what Leary and Kowalski (1990) call *impression motivation*—should lead to different negotiation responses, depending on the negotiators' membership in stereotyped groups. Further, participants should be more able to change their actual performance in the negotiation context, given that “desirable” and “undesirable” behaviors involve choice more than aptitude. Specifically, being told to “make a positive impression” may cue negotiators to counter whatever negative tendencies they believe others see in them, and to display a contrasting demeanor.

According to Kray and colleagues (Kray, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2002; Kray & Thompson, 2005), women tend to be seen as soft, emotional, and irrational—traits that are bad for negotiation, in which aggressive behavior is seen as preferable for claiming value. Kray and her colleagues have also shown that men are seen as more likely to show aggressive negotiating behavior. Therefore, we expected that women who are motivated to make a positive impression should want to deny that they are weak, ineffective negotiators and thus advocate more strongly for their own interests. By contrast, men who are motivated to make a positive impression may try to soften any aggressive tendencies and to appear more conciliatory.<sup>1</sup> In the language of Godfrey, Jones, and Lord (1986), women may try to foster an impression of “competence,” whereas men may try to foster an impression of “likeability.”

The stereotype threat literature has argued convincingly that threat applies only in *valued* domains of performance. For instance, only among students who care about performing well academically should stereotype threat depress test performance. Similarly, in the current domain, only those groups who feel particularly concerned with good negotiation performance should be susceptible to stereotype threat (or reactance). In Kray et al.'s (2001) work, the authors argued that the entire sample of MBA students represented a group that cared deeply about good performance in the domain of negotiation. We, too, elected to use an MBA student sample; however, we believed (consistent with later research by Kray et al., 2004) that it might be possible to further bolster performance concerns by manipulating the status of the role that the negotiator assumed.

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<sup>1</sup>It may seem surprising that we expect men to view their usual aggressive tendencies as undesirable. After all, male competitiveness is often prized, and men often respond to other men's aggression with their own (Porath, Overbeck, & Pearson, in press). We conducted an earlier pilot study in which men were presented with a negotiation vignette based on the exercise used in this study. The men were asked how they would conduct themselves during the negotiation in (a) a high impression-motivation condition, and (b) a low impression-motivation condition. When making a good impression was *not* important, the men reported much greater likelihood of using aggressive behavior, and much less likelihood of yielding to the counterpart. However, when making a good impression *was* important, they reported the reverse. This suggests that men see aggressive behavior as interpersonally undesirable, and yielding behavior as more desirable.

Role status should interact with impression motivation for two reasons. First, negotiators in high-status roles may feel that they should live up to others' expectations of their status. If they are further told that they should care about making a good impression, then this concern with upholding their own image should be even stronger. Thus, we expected that stereotype threat would be particularly likely to arise among these high-status negotiators, and stereotype reactance also should be more likely. Second, Hall (2006) argued that the effects of status and power are often isomorphic, and social *power* is often associated with greater behavioral freedom and lower constraint (Chekroun & Brauer, 2002; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Overbeck, Tiedens, & Brion, 2006). This suggests that high *status* may also lead to greater freedom to act on an impression motivation. In this case, although both high- and low-status negotiators may wish to change their behavior in response to impression motivation, it is possible that only the high-status negotiators are able to implement such changes to the extent that we can observe performance consequences.

In this article, we examine the ways in which impression motivation affects negotiators' ability to claim value and make a positive impression on their counterparts. This issue has important implications for negotiators, who need to optimize their performance in order to claim value for themselves. It is also important for scholars to understand how gender, status, and motivations interact in producing responses to stereotypes.

We present a study in which we examine how same-gender dyads respond to different impression-management instructions. We expected that impression motivation would lead negotiators to work against stereotyped weaknesses in their "natural" tendencies. More specifically, we hypothesized that women, for whom the gender stereotype predicts a focus on others, should try to be tougher and claim more value (i.e., earn more points) for themselves when highly motivated to make a good impression. On the other hand, men, for whom the gender stereotype predicts a focus on the self, would believe that they should be more conciliatory and claim less value (i.e., earn fewer points) in order to make a positive impression when highly motivated to do so. We expected this pattern to emerge only among those negotiators who were particularly motivated and empowered to demonstrate their merit in the negotiation domain—that is, negotiators enacting a high-status role. We did not expect to see such a difference emerge among low-status negotiators, who might be unable to translate impression motivation into behavior, or might not even feel as strong a need for the self-protective response of stereotype reactance. Finally, although negotiators may adopt these strategies in an effort to improve the impressions made of them, it is an open question whether they will succeed. Thus, the study also explores how gender, status, and impression motivation affect actual impressions.

## Method

### Overview

We assigned men and women in same-sex dyads to conduct a simulated employment negotiation. The parties were assigned to represent a higher-status role within the company ("Vice President") or a lower-status role ("Middle Manager"); this status

manipulation was fully crossed with an impression motivation factor in which half were given incentives to make a positive impression on their counterparts. We examined participants' economic outcomes (the points earned in the negotiation) as well as the actual impressions that counterparts reported.

## Participants

The negotiators in this study comprised 190 students enrolled in a required MBA course on organizational behavior at the business school of a major university in the United States. Students participated in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. These students were grouped into 95 same-sex dyads (23 female and 72 male).

## Materials and Procedure

Participants were presented with a negotiation task based on a standard negotiation exercise called "The New Recruit" (Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994). This is an eight-issue employment negotiation between a candidate (who was in this case a low status Middle Manager, or MM) and a recruiter (who was in this case a high status Vice President, or VP).<sup>2</sup> The eight issues in the exercise are presented in Table 1; they include two distributive, or "fixed-sum," issues on which the parties' interests were mutually opposing; two compatible issues on which the parties' interests were aligned; and four integrative, or "pie-expanding," issues on which the parties could make trade-offs that maximized both individual and overall value. The outcomes for each issue were represented in terms of points that negotiators could earn; this provided an objective metric for participants to set goals and gauge their performance. Participants were informed that failure to reach an agreement would result in a score of zero points. To provide an incentive for maximizing individual performance, participants were informed that two dyads would be selected at random and its members would receive cash payments in proportion to the individual points they had earned in their negotiation.

One week prior to the negotiation, each participant received a set of written confidential instructions indicating his or her role assignment (no rationale was given for this assignment, which was done randomly within sex), background information, the list of issues, and a table providing point payouts at different levels of agreement. The same set of eight issues was presented to all participants, yet each participant could see only the point payouts for his or her own role. Instructions were tailored to the specific role details of Middle Managers and Vice Presidents. For example, both parties were informed that the Middle Manager was seeking a transfer from one division of the company to another and, although the Middle Manager's application had met all the basic

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<sup>2</sup>Past research has consistently shown that participants interpret roles such as VP as higher in status and power, and roles such as MM as lower in status and power. Manipulation checks confirming this pattern in comparable manipulations were reported—even, at times, when not anticipated—by Anderson and Thompson (2004), Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia (1997), Galinsky et al. (2003), Pinkley et al. (1994), and Wolfe and McGinn (2005).

Table 1  
Points Schedule for the Negotiation Simulation

Issues and potential options	Points		Issues and potential options	Points	
	Vice President (recruiter)	Middle Manager (candidate)		Vice President (recruiter)	Middle Manager (candidate)
Signing bonus			Moving expenses Reimb.		
10%	0	4,000	100%	0	3,200
8%	400	3,000	90%	200	2,400
6%	800	2,000	80%	400	1,600
4%	1,200	1,000	70%	600	800
2%	1,600	0	60%	800	0
Job assignment			Insurance provider		
Division A	0	0	Allen Ins.	0	800
Division B	-600	-600	ABC Ins.	800	600
Division C	-1,200	-1,200	Good Health	1,600	400
Division D	-1,800	-1,800	Best Ins. Co.	2,400	200
Division E	-2,400	-2,400	Insure Alba	3,200	0
Vacation days			Salary		
30 days	0	1,600	\$90,000	-6,000	0
25 days	1,000	1,200	\$88,000	-4,500	-1,500
20 days	2,000	800	\$86,000	-3,000	-3,000
15 days	3,000	400	\$84,000	-1,500	-4,500
10 days	4,000	0	\$82,000	0	-6,000
Starting date			Company car		
June 1	0	2,400	LUX EX2	1,200	1,200
June 15	600	1,800	MOD 250	900	900
July 1	1,200	1,200	RAND XTR	600	600
July 15	1,800	600	DE PAS 450	300	300
Aug 1	2,400	0	PALO LSR	0	0

Note. Participants saw only their own points schedule.

criteria, it was up to the Vice President to authorize the transfer, provided that specific terms of the compensation package could be mutually agreed upon.

Although all participants were given the explicitly stated goal of maximizing their own personal gain (i.e., “reach an agreement with the other person on all eight issues that is best for you. The more points you earn, the better for you”), those randomly assigned to the *high impression motivation* condition also received the following instruction:

Immediately following this meeting, the Middle Manager [VP] will be asked some questions about his or her impressions of you. If the Middle Manager [VP] regards you positively, then the total points you earn in this simulation will be increased by as much as 100%. If the Middle Manager [VP] regards you negatively, then the total points you earn in this simulation will be decreased by as much as 100%. Please do not discuss explicitly the fact that the Middle Manager [VP] will soon be evaluating you in this way.

Participants randomly assigned to the *control* condition (i.e., no impression motivation) were not given any additional instruction. Together, our manipulations constitute a 2 (dyad sex: male vs. female)  $\times$  2 (VP impression motivation: high vs. control)  $\times$  2 (MM impression motivation: high vs. control) design, with the latter two factors varying both within and between dyads.

The negotiation was conducted outside of class over a period of 1 week. Immediately following the negotiation, participants recorded the terms of their agreement in the form of an online questionnaire. The questionnaire also included three items assessing impressions of one's counterpart. The items, measured on 7-point scales, asked how much the participant liked the counterpart and respected the counterpart, with 7 = "very much," and assessed the overall impression of the counterpart, with 7 = "very positive."

## Dependent Measures

The points earned and the three impression questions were converted to dependent measures as follows. To assess how points were divided between the parties (hereafter, *value claiming*), we looked at the difference in points earned by the VP and MM, with the goal of capturing asymmetry in the number of points earned (cf. Kray et al., 2001). To assess joint benefit (hereafter, *value creation*), we summed across VP and MM points; relatively higher totals indicate that the dyad found ways to create more value than did other dyads. We combined the three impression items into one scale, which showed acceptable reliability ( $\alpha = .71$ ), to capture the rater's impression of his or her counterpart. We calculated this variable in two versions, one capturing the MMs' impression of their VP counterparts, and one capturing the VPs' impression of their MM counterparts, and analyzed these separately.

## Results

In all results reported here, the total number of dyads is 94. One dyad, comprised of two male participants, failed to negotiate an agreement within the specified bargaining zone and was excluded from the analyses (cf. Kray et al., 2001). As recommended by Tripp and Sondak (1992), dyads that declared impasse were assigned their no-agreement score (i.e., 0 points) and included in all analyses.<sup>3</sup> The dyad is the unit of analysis.

### Value Claiming

Our primary hypothesis called for a two-way interaction of gender and VP impression motivation, such that high status men would respond to high impression motivation by yielding to their low-status counterparts, whereas high status women

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<sup>3</sup>There were 13 dyads that declared an impasse. The dyads were fairly evenly distributed across conditions, except that there were no impasse dyads involving control group MMs.






Figure 1. Mean individual points earned as a function of status and impression motivation condition.

would respond to high impression motivation by claiming more value for themselves. Indeed, this prediction was confirmed,  $F(1, 86) = 5.08, p < .05$ . As shown in Figure 1 and Table 2, among men, high impression motivation VPs claimed an average of 1,234 fewer points than their MM counterparts, whereas control VPs claimed an average of 389 points more than their counterparts. By contrast, among women, high impression motivation VPs claimed an average of 2,233 *more* points than their MM counterparts, whereas control VPs claimed an average of 36 fewer points than their counterparts. No other main effects or interactions reached statistical significance (all  $F_s < 2.79$ ).

Table 2  
*Negotiation Outcomes as a Function of Gender and Impression Motivation*

	Negotiation outcomes			
	Value claimed (VP – MM)		Value created (VP + MM)	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
<b>Males</b>				
VP control condition				
MM control condition	422	4,225	8,033	4,689
MM high impression motivation	456	3,770	8,333	4,351
Overall	<b>439</b>	<b>3,947</b>	<b>8,183</b>	<b>4,460</b>
VP high impression motivation				
MM control condition	-1,211	3,334	10,333	2,993
MM high impression motivation	-1,259	2,320	8,682	3,681
Overall	<b>-1,234</b>	<b>2,845</b>	<b>9,531</b>	<b>3,400</b>
<b>Females</b>				
VP control condition				
MM control condition	-520	4,046	8,400	1,643
MM high impression motivation	367	3,061	6,300	5,268
Overall	<b>-36</b>	<b>3,383</b>	<b>7,255</b>	<b>4,020</b>
VP high impression motivation				
MM control condition	1,933	5,230	9,500	1,756
MM high impression motivation	2,533	4,302	8,900	4,685
Overall	<b>2,233</b>	<b>4,576</b>	<b>9,200</b>	<b>3,388</b>

**Value Creation**

We examined the effects of gender and impression motivation on joint value created by the dyad. The overall amount of value created did not depend on either gender or our manipulation of impression motivation (all *F*s < 2.80).

**Actual Impressions Formed**

As mentioned above, we conducted two separate analyses involving the impressions participants formed of their counterparts—one involving MMs’ impressions of VPs, and the other involving VPs’ impressions of MMs. For both analyses, we included only the judgments made by control participants, who were *not* in the high impression motivation condition, because we wanted to preclude having perceivers’ ratings affected by their own self-presentational concerns (see Neuberg, Judice, Virdin, & Carrillo, 1993).

When the MMs rated VPs, we found a two-way interaction between gender and VP impression motivation,  $F(1, 42) = 4.43, p < .05$ . As shown in Table 3, high impression motivation male VPs were rated slightly higher than control male VPs ( $M = 5.17$  and  $4.98$ , respectively), whereas high impression motivation female VPs were rated more *negatively* than control female VPs ( $M = 4.69$  and  $5.73$ , respectively). Neither the main

Table 3  
*Impressions Made as a Function of Gender and Impression Motivation*

	Impressions made	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Males		
VPs		
Control condition	4.98	.98
High impression motivation	5.17	.69
MMs		
Control condition	5.02	.90
High impression motivation	5.25	1.04
Females		
VPs		
Control condition	5.73	.86
High impression motivation	4.69	.79
MMs		
Control condition	5.47	.30
High impression motivation	4.50	1.59

*Note.* Impressions made represents a combination of liking, respect, and overall positivity of impression made on counterparts who were not themselves in the high impression motivation condition.

effect of gender nor the main effect of VP impression motivation was significant (both  $F_s < 2.15$ ). When the VPs rated MMs, a similar, yet marginal two-way interaction emerged (see Table 3),  $F(1, 40) = 2.79$ ,  $p = .10$ . Once again, neither the main effect of gender nor the main effect of MM impression motivation was significant (both  $F_s < 1.06$ ).

To assess the potential trade-off between economic performance and the positivity of impressions made in negotiations, we conducted a follow-up analysis. We found a negative correlation between the proportion of points earned by VPs and impressions made on their MM counterparts,  $r(80) = -.24$ ,  $p < .05$ , suggesting that high-status negotiators were seen more negatively when they performed well. This negative correlation was even stronger for women,  $r(20) = -.41$ ,  $p = .07$ , although it failed to reach statistical significance. We found no correlation between the proportion of points earned by MMs and impressions made on their VP counterparts,  $r(78) = .07$ , ns.

## Discussion

This study supports the idea that impression motivation can lead to stereotype reactance. As predicted, when highly motivated to make a positive impression, high-status men yielded value to their counterparts whereas high status women claimed more value for themselves. The success of these strategies was mixed. In the end, the men's strategy succeeded in producing a positive impression in the counterpart's eyes but the women's strategy failed to do so, leaving them judged more negatively than others. In short, it appears that women who occupy high-status positions can benefit instrumentally from

impression motivation, but may pay relationally, whereas men in the same positions can benefit relationally, but pay instrumentally.

These findings shed light on basic processes surrounding responses to stereotypes in valued performance domains, supporting von Hippel et al.'s (2005) assertion that members of stereotyped groups may show reactance against stereotypes when they are concerned with impression management. The findings also provide important practical information for negotiators, particularly women, in terms of how to incorporate situational and motivational factors into a strategy for improving performance.

These results suggest that there may be, at some level, an inherent trade-off between economic performance and the positivity of the impression one makes in negotiations. This is somewhat disheartening in light of the frequent recommendations by theorists and practitioners that negotiators should try to achieve both instrumental and interpersonal excellence. As negotiators can intuitively grasp, doing so may be more difficult than the advisors suggest—particularly for women, since they face a “double bind”: a gender stereotype that depicts them as too soft on the problem, yet if they behave aggressively and agentically, then too hard on the people. As others have found, it appears that women who are competent and agentic may face a “backlash effect” (Rudman, 1998; Rudman & Glick, 2001) in which they are judged particularly harshly on social and interpersonal dimensions. For example, Ely (1994) studied women in male-dominated firms, contexts in which their female gender was devalued. Junior women in these contexts reported negative impressions of their senior women colleagues, calling them poor role models who “acted too much like men” (Ely, 1994; p. 21). Lamentably, our data do nothing to contradict these findings. If anything, they underscore the difficulties faced by professional women and the advantages sometimes enjoyed by professional men.

Perhaps our primary contribution, however, is to demonstrate that stereotype reactance may occur, not just in response to the explicit mention of stereotype content, but also in response to impression motivation. This work provides an important extension of Kray et al.'s (2001) work on stereotype reactance, along with von Hippel et al.'s (2005) argument that impression motivation fosters stereotype denial.

## Limitations

The study has some important limitations. First, while we identify a pattern of different responses by sex, we did not measure any intervening variables that could account for the difference. Also, we did not include a manipulation check to examine how the participants construed our experimental manipulation of impression motivation. We argue that this is generally true in stereotype threat research, and that our pattern of findings provides ample evidence of stereotype reactance. Moreover, in our study, status was a critical variable moderating the occurrence of reactance. Nevertheless, future studies would benefit from additional manipulation checks and measures aimed at clarifying why status differences might lead to different patterns. In future research, we hope to address this question.

Second, our study uses only same-gender dyads. Behavior in mixed-gender dyads might be substantially different, though it is unclear whether such a context would

exacerbate or attenuate our current patterns. Leary et al. (1994) suggest that women in mixed-gender interactions might use even more competency-oriented strategies than women in same-gender interactions. Conversely, in the current context, the high-status women's interaction partners were other women, and that may have freed them to be assertive; against men, whose gender confers higher status in general, they may have felt constrained by their own gender (Carli, LaFleur, & Loeber, 1995). Again, we hope in future research to explore this issue further.

## Conclusions

Perhaps being told to “make a positive impression” is akin to being told that our normal behavior is not sufficiently commendable, and that we should behave in a contrasting manner. This possibility, coupled with our evidence of an inherent trade-off between one's instrumental and interpersonal outcomes, poses a serious challenge for negotiators. In trying to make a good impression, it appears that negotiators must consider more carefully what sort of impression is most valuable to them, given their goals in the current negotiation. And perhaps they must be prepared to make trade-offs not only among the issues on the table, but also among the kinds of outcomes they hope to maximize.

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