Pardon Me, Mr. Carter
Amnesty and Unfinished Business of Vietnam in Jimmy Carter’s 1976 Campaign

During the 1976 presidential campaign, former Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter could not avoid the “unfinished business of the [Vietnam] war,” specifically the fate of the United States’ war resisters, the million or so draft evaders and military deserters. To heal the domestic wounds of the Vietnam War, Carter promised to enact a “blanket pardon” for draft evaders during the first week of his presidency and thereafter to offer conditional, case-by-case pardons for military deserters. This article analyzes the domestic legacy of the Vietnam War in the 1976 election, most notably how, after considering media coverage, alternative news sources, and polling data, Carter and his campaign staff addressed the controversial campaign issue in an effort to “get the Vietnam war over with.” Although magazines and television broadcasts provided important campaign information in 1976, newspapers remained a prominent news source. Thus, this article explores the negotiation over the meaning of the war resister issue among the Carter campaign, the press, and the public, and the structure of feeling that emerged in the analysis of archival documents at the Carter Library and in a census of a sample of news articles, feature stories, house editorials, columns, and letters to the editor in the top six circulating U.S. dailies.

For some, the most moving moment of the Democratic convention occurred when two young men of the Vietnam era embraced each other on the stage—one who fought and one who ran way,” Mary McGrory, a Pulitzer Prize-winning, Washington-based political journalist, observed in her August 2, 1976, syndicated column for the Boston Globe. McGrory, a fierce opponent of the Vietnam War, wrote of the “tableau” created by the appearance of war resister Fritz Efaw bending to embrace paralyzed veteran Ron Kovic on the main stage of the 1976 Democratic National Convention in New York. Kovic seconded Efaw’s nomination for vice president. Although the nomination had been largely symbolic (Efaw, age twenty-nine, could not occupy the position), it represented a segment of the party’s fight for amnesty and desire to “heal the wounds of Vietnam.”

Despite gavel-to-gavel national network television coverage of the Democratic convention in mid-July, some Americans would not have a chance to see the symbolic act. ABC, which offered limited coverage of the proceedings, refused to acknowledge the nomination, and the other networks, according to one New York Times television critic, provided “superficial coverage,” missing the opportunity to delve more deeply into the issue of amnesty.

The network television cameras may not have captured the scene, but through her words, McGrory shared the image with the readers of her syndicated columns. She also captured the immediate reaction to the gesture, offering insights into the cultural milieu surrounding the domestic legacy of the Vietnam War. In 1972, George McGovern had lost his bid for the presidency on his platform disparaged by critics as one that centered only on “amnesty, abortion, and acid,” and four years later, unconditional amnesty remained a contentious issue with the potential to once again divide the party. McGrory offered her readers a window into the divisive nature of amnesty as she described the dramatic response as Efaw and Kovic exited the stage. Democratic leader Hubert H. Humphrey, a vocal opponent of unconditional amnesty, patted Efaw on the back, assuring him that he would consider the measure, but one Alabama delegate refused to shake Efaw’s hand as
the pair pushed through the teary-eyed crowd. In the immediate aftermath of the convention, a local Veteran of Foreign Wars post expelled Kovic for “hugging that goddam draft dodger,” and Efaw, a fugitive from justice, was arrested in Oklahoma City the last week of July, McGrory reported. Even still, as the headline of the article indicated, the pair and millions of others held out “modest hope for amnesty,” “putting all their chips on [Democratic nominee] Jimmy Carter” and his promise of a “blanket pardon.”

These “modest hopes” in the dark-horse candidate must have seemed rather dim only months earlier. At the outset of his campaign, Carter, a retired naval officer and member of the American Legion in Americus, Georgia, had hesitated to support unconditional amnesty, but after reviewing materials culled by his issues staff from various factions, including the National Council for Universal and Unconditional Amnesty, and publications such as the Congressional Fact-Sheet on Amnesty and the alternative newsmagazine Amex-Canada, Carter made the “single hardest decision [of his] campaign” and offered a “blanket pardon” to draft resisters and evaders. As his campaign gained traction during the early caucuses and primaries, he informed the national press of his position on the controversial issue. In a March 16 interview with the Washington Post, he told editors and reporters he wanted to “get the Vietnam war over with.” He continued, “I don’t have the desire to punish anyone. I’d just like to tell the young folks who did defect to come home.”

In the coming weeks and months, reporters outlined Carter’s position, and newspaper editorial boards, political columnists, and letter-to-the-editor writers expressed opinions about the topic. In addition to comparing his platform to those of other candidates, most notably incumbent Gerald Ford, they considered the semantics of Carter’s promise, the politics behind his position, and the likelihood of an extension of the pardon to military deserters. In the last instance, they contended the “unfinished business of war” remained a divisive issue, and they wondered whether Carter might be able to “heal the domestic wounds of Vietnam.”

Healing the domestic wounds of the controversial Vietnam War, however, proved to be no simple task for Carter. An unprecedented national crisis for the United States, the Vietnam War was “the disruption of the American story” that exposed the myth of exceptionalism and introduced the narrative of American failure. Whether an imperialistic plot or a well-intentioned mistake, the Vietnam War differed from previous conflicts in which the United States had engaged, and its domestic consequences lacked an easy fix. Scholars have written reams about the military, sociocultural, and political history of the Vietnam quagmire, the influence of the first “television war,” and the conflict’s place in American memory. This study about the domestic impact of the Vietnam War on the Carter campaign extends the aforementioned scholarship and answers historian David Kieran’s call to engage in research about the legacy and effect of the Vietnam War beyond the war itself and its continued juxtaposition with other conflicts.

This article examines the domestic legacy of the Vietnam War in the 1976 election, most notably how, after considering media coverage, alternative news sources, and polling data, Carter and his campaign staff addressed the controversial concepts of amnesty and pardons for draft evaders and military deserters. Through analysis of thematic patterns in archival documents and in media coverage of Carter’s position, this article explores the negotiation over meaning of the war resister issue among Carter, the press, and the public. Further, this study analyzes the structure of feeling that emerged in mediated texts gleaned from a full-text search of ProQuest Historical Newspapers, which resulted in a census of 350 news articles, feature stories, house editorials, columns, and letters to the editor from the top six circulating U.S. dailies in the United States.

This article provides evidence that despite assertions from Carter that the U.S. press had forsaken the coverage of consequential issues and the retort from journalists that Carter’s campaign was the least focused on issues in modern history, both parties negotiated the meaning of controversial campaign matters such as draft dodgers and articulated nuanced stances on the issue of amnesty and presidential pardons. Nevertheless, in a post-Watergate age of personality politics, media coverage of this issue was overshadowed and received less attention than the image of presidential aspirants such as Carter.

Despite television’s competing role as a dominant news source, approximately half of Americans relied on newspapers as their primary news source in 1976. Thus, during each day of the Carter campaign, most Americans read at least one newspaper, including content such as news articles, op-eds, and letters to the editor. This study applies the theoretical approach of historians James Carey and Raymond Williams to understand the material trace of “the structure of feeling” in U.S. media coverage of presidential politics. More specifically, this study focuses on the relationship among the Carter candidacy, the U.S. press, and the domestic legacy of the Vietnam War.

The researchers culled and examined hundreds of archival documents from the Carter Library in Atlanta. The researchers also consulted the Ayer Directory of Publications to determine the top six U.S. dailies by circulation in 1976 and gathered relevant full-text articles published in these dailies from January 1, 1976, until January 31, 1977. The archival documents were identified through a search of Carter Library finding aids, and newspaper texts were identified...
by employing the search terms “Jimmy Carter,” “Vietnam,” and “draft” in the ProQuest Historical Newspapers database. Overall, the researchers analyzed a census of 292 archival documents and 350 news articles, feature stories, house editorials, columns, and letters to the editor published in the Wall Street Journal (n = 76; circulation: 1,406,192), the Los Angeles Times (n = 70; circulation: 1,406,192), the New York Times (n = 70; circulation: 806,495), the Chicago Tribune (n = 5; circulation: 750,707), the Washington Post (n = 67; circulation: 534,400), and the Boston Globe (n = 62; circulation: 276,621).

To investigate the archival documents and newspaper articles in relation to their cultural and political contexts, the researchers employed discourse analysis.17 Discourse analysis considers the symbolic nature of media narratives and “the ideational function of language.”18 Following the steps outlined by Stuart Hall in his introduction to Paper Voices, this analysis involved several close readings of the text, identification of discursive themes, selection of representative examples, and interpretation of the articles within the framework of a wider discussion of presidential politics and the domestic legacy of the Vietnam War. After describing the sociopolitical and cultural milieu that gave rise to Carter’s candidacy and the war resister campaign issue, the article provides insight into how, after considering both alternative and mainstream media coverage and other sources of information, Carter crafted his position. This article also explores emergent themes in media coverage of the 1976 campaign in the top U.S. dailies; the negotiation over the meaning of the war resister issue among Carter, the press, and the public; and the structure of feeling that emerged in our analysis of various texts. Finally, this study concludes with remarks on the implications of these conditions on Carter’s presidency and American life thereafter.

While advertising guru Gerald Rafshoon was mounting a last-ditch gubernatorial advertising campaign to raise awareness of a little-known Georgia state senator by the name of Jimmy Carter in August 1966, a band of rebellious reporters popularized the term “credibility gap” to describe the discrepancy between the public pronouncements of official Washington sources and the reality of the Vietnam War.19 The term gained a place in the American lexicon when Washington Post correspondent Murray Marder expressed concern over the “growing doubt and cynicism concerning Administration pronouncements.”20 He conveyed what national war correspondents such as Neil Sheehan of the New York Times had been voicing in recent months. By 1966, Sheehan and others had begun reporting the disparities between their sources on the ground and official voices in the U.S. Embassy and the administration of President Lyndon Johnson.

Journalists such as Sheehan have been credited with shaping and changing U.S. public opinion about the Vietnam War,21 particularly as they reported on the increase in cumulative national casualties and ongoing marginal casualties in the mid-1960s.22 Dramatic photojournalism and visual representations of Vietnam as well as photographs of domestic protests garnered sympathies for the victims of violence and, thus, initiated a decline in U.S. public support for the war.23 News coverage of the Tet Offensive in 1968 and the My Lai Massacre in 1969 marked a shift in public opinion as Americans perceived that U.S. troops were faring poorly and that Vietnamese civilians were suffering horrific deaths.24 Influenced by media and the sociocultural climate around them, some individuals sought immunity from the draft through student deferments, employment in agricultural or defense industries, marriage and fatherhood, or entry into the clergy or National Guard. Once drafted, some sought to avoid duty as conscientious objectors, but, as the legal system debated the interpretation of the conscientious objector classification in the late 1960s, thousands fled as exiles or were convicted of draft evasion.25 Some became vocal protesters in the process. Although the resistance to the military draft may have caused a minimal shift in public opinion, news media coverage of the war and foreign policy was an agency of change more so than war demonstrations.26 The return of U.S. veterans who served in Vietnam also may have changed public perceptions as they shared their stories of jungle warfare.27

The disparate voices of individuals such as Sheehan, CBS news anchor Walter Cronkite, who had announced in February 1968 that the war was “unwinnable,” and war protestors Fritz Efaw and Sam Brown contributed to President Richard Nixon’s announcement on January 23, 1973, that the United States would end its involvement in Vietnam.28 While U.S. ground forces withdrew on August 15, 1973, the conflict continued through April 1975 when the North Vietnamese Army vanquished the Saigon regime and the U.S. Embassy was evacuated. U.S. military forces, however, remained on active alert in the region for years to come. Likewise, the domestic legacy of the Vietnam War lingered in the form of the grieving families of the more than 58,000 Americans who lost their lives in Southeast Asia and the lamenting loved ones of the million or so war resisters who had been punished for their protests or who still lived in exile. The United States collectively mourned the former, but was torn over the fate of the latter.

By September 1974, as Georgia Governor Carter prepared to announce his 1976 presidential candidacy, 56 percent of Americans supported amnesty for draft evaders, according to the polling data of Lou Harris; likewise, a greater percentage of the public was in favor of granting military deserters complete amnesty than those who favored prosecuting them to the letter of the law.29 The increased public support was due to the arbitrary nature of the conscription process and the nebulous grounds for conscientious objections.30 The issue touched thousands of lives, but figures for the exact numbers of draft evaders and military deserters were elusive. A 1974 article appearing in U.S. News & World Report cited the Justice Department and the Pentagon to claim a total of 44,538 evaders and deserters.31 Amex-Canada, an alternative press publication written for the approximately 30,000 American exiles living in Canada, asserted there were 637,000 military resisters and up to 200,000 draft evaders. Research later revealed that of the 1,857,304 Americans drafted between 1964 and 1973, approximately 210,000 individuals violated the Selective Service Act, but only 4 percent of them were convicted.32

Carter, like the nation he hoped to represent as president, grappled with issues related to the Vietnam War. He publically supported U.S. involvement in Vietnam until 1973,33 but as a presidential aspirant, he claimed the Vietnam War was a mistake, an effort that lacked moral principle.34 He claimed he wanted the war to be finished in the hearts and minds of Americans.35 Furthermore, Carter attempted to capitalize on the credibility gap that emerged during the Vietnam War. The credibility gap appeared during the Johnson administration and widened during the Nixon administration as both presidents broadened war efforts while publicly claiming the desire to end hostilities. Thus, Carter and his aides constructed a candidate who offered moral reform for Washington, and they inserted language to indicate as much into Carter’s announcement speech that he delivered to the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., on December 12, 1974.
“Recently, we have discovered that our trust has been betrayed,” he said, referring to both the credibility gap surrounding the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal. “The veils of secrecy have seemed to thicken around Washington.” He promised “a government that is honest and competent, with clear purpose and strong leadership [that] can work with the American people to meet the challenges of the present and the future.” He concluded by leaving the audience with a question, “Why not the best?” And he offered himself as the solution for the nation’s ailments.37

After Carter announced his candidacy in December 1974, he and issues coordinator Stuart Eizenstat immediately began considering the candidate’s positions on a host of issues, including amnesty for war resisters. Eizenstat and his staff culled materials from a variety of pro- and anti-amnesty groups, most notably Amnesty-Canada’s Amnesty Issue, a Religious Statements on Amnesty pamphlet, Americans for Amnesty’s Update on National Amnesty Week newsletter, and Amnesty Information Service’s Amnesty Fact Sheet. In the alternative newsmagazine’s Amnesty-Canada’s special amnesty issue, Carter and his staff read a comprehensive account of the views of pro-amnesty exiles in Canada.38 “The U.S. war in Indochina was an unjust war. It was both unconstitutional and in violation of international law. . . . [C]onsequently, war resisters should not be punished further for attempting to end Washington’s criminal activities,” the newsmagazine told readers in an article demanding “universal and unconditional amnesty.”39

Through Carter’s secretary, Bebe Smith, Carter and his staff collected and considered media clips related to the topic and subsequently requested transcripts of congressional testimony.40 Such news sources revealed that amnesty for war resisters was still a controversial topic and a potentially divisive campaign issue. For instance, a New York Times news article provided Carter’s staff with the results of a September 1974 Lou Harris poll indicating that approximately half of Americans approved of conditional amnesty with two years of alternative service.41 Likewise, in response to Smith’s request for information, William Dixon, general counsel on the House of Representative’s judiciary committee, stressed the all-encompassing nature of amnesty. “I believe the important thing to remember in considering this subject,” he wrote, “is that when a majority of people call for amnesty . . . they are not just referring to 15,000 draft resisters and deserters. We are also referring to the 600,000 young men—mostly undereducated, mostly poor, and disproportionately from minority groups—who will bear the stigma of less than honorable discharges.”42

With this in mind, Bill Strauss, the deputy director of the University of Notre Dame’s Center for Civil Rights’ Vietnam Offender Study, prepared an issues paper offering a “balanced position on the amnesty issue” for Carter aide Peter Bourne in mid-February 1976. In the letter accompanying the position paper, he observed: “Gov. Carter’s early comments [to the media] on the issue were very good. He wisely deflected the issue from ‘amnesty’ to the same thing under another label (‘blanket pardons’). This is the only way a lot of middle-of-the-road people can be persuaded to do anything, I suggest that he continue this approach.”43 He then suggested the specific language Carter might use to articulate his position to national political reporters and the U.S. public:

I am not for amnesty, because amnesty would mean that we must forget all the lessons and sacrifices of the Vietnam War. . . . Fifty-five thousand lives were lost in service to this country. Tens of thousands of families have suffered the ordeal of a son in exile. . . . It would be unfair—indeed impossible—to forget these sacrifices. Instead, we should . . . look with an open heart at those who suffered in other ways . . . . As President, I would offer neither amnesty nor clemency, but rather blanket pardons to Vietnam-era draft and military offenders. . . . I would be asking . . . all Americans—to disregard totally any pardoned offenses whenever making decisions affecting these people.44

In the position paper, Strauss referred to Executive Order No. 11803, signed into law by Ford on September 16, 1974. Under this order, a clemency board, composed of seventeen members, pardoned those who were convicted of civilian crimes and clemency discharge for military absences in exchange for twenty-four months of alternative service. The board received 18,354 applications—only 15 percent of those eligible to apply—before the program was discontinued in March 1975 due to a low level of participation.45 The dismantlement of the program left Congress and presidential aspirants such as Carter scrambling to find a better solution. Strauss noted that “clemency under President Ford’s terms” had not been enough. Based on the advice of Strauss and others, Carter selected a middling approach to appeal to the broadest swath of potential voters. Carefully avoiding the controversial term “amnesty,” Carter offered “blanket pardons” to Vietnam War draft evaders.

Critics in the national press condemned Carter for avoiding clear positions on the issues. After he won four of the first five Democratic presidential primaries, editors and reporters from the Washington Post interviewed Carter about his position on the issues, including amnesty for war resisters. Carter told the Washington Post how he wrestled with the controversial issue:

In the area of the country where I live, defecting from military services is almost unheard of. Most of the young people in my section of Georgia are quite poor. They didn’t know where Sweden was, they didn’t know how to get to Canada, and they didn’t have enough money to hide in college. They thought the war was wrong. They preferred to stay at home, but still they went to Vietnam. . . . It’s very difficult for me to equate what they did with what the young people did who left the country. So for a long time, it was hard for me to address the question in objective fashion, but I think it’s time to get the Vietnam War over with.46

Carter then promised, if elected, to issue a “blanket pardon” for all draft evaders during his first week in office.

In the Vietnam War era, media did much to shape U.S. public opinion.47 In the first presidential campaign after the Vietnam War, as in many other presidential campaigns, journalists gave candidates name recognition as well as set the agenda by which the public discussed and analyzed candidates and their positions on the issues.48 As soon as Carter crafted and articulated his platform for handling draft evaders, reporters and columnists began to negotiate an understanding of his position and to question the use of his terminology. Such media attention not only set the agenda for the discourse surrounding the 1976 campaign but also likely influenced public opinion about the Carter candidacy.49

For example, one Washington Post reporter asked in a March 16 interview, “Why do you call it pardon rather than amnesty?” “To
Carter replied. "I don’t intend to criticize the young people who left the country, I’d just issue a blanket pardon without comments."50 Carter granted a series of interviews to “convince voters” that he was “not fuzzy on the issues,” a critique leveled by both his political opponents and his critics in the national press.51 Many reporters, however, remained confused by his distinction between amnesty and pardon. A Washington Post reporter also asked on March 16, "You’ve defined pardon as ‘whether what you did was right or wrong, you are forgiven.’ But isn’t a pardon really given after a finding of guilt? Isn’t that the common definition of a pardon?"52 Carter dodged the question with a political quip: "I don’t remember Richard Nixon having been found guilty."

Columnists further questioned Carter’s “subtle distinction” between pardon and amnesty. For example, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak suggested that Carter’s semantic distinction was an attempt to craft an “ideologically nondescript posture,” a “moderate middle course to unite the country.”53 Evans and Novak launched a syndicated column in 1963 and established the “Evans-Novak Political Report” four years later; by the time of the 1976 presidential campaign, their columns, known for inside political dope with a conservative bent, were among the most widely read editorials in the United States.54 Evans and Novak claimed that Carter’s position on draft evaders was rhetorically facile and simply a matter of strategy.55

Carter’s murky distinction of terms and the attempts of political reporters and columnists to make sense of his position lingered throughout the presidential primary season. On May 9, Carter reminded Robert Shogan, the Los Angeles Times’s national political correspondent with experience covering three presidential administrations, "In my opinion, amnesty says what you did was right. Pardon says, whether what you did was right or wrong, you are forgiven for it."56 Under the direction of issues coordinator Eizenstat and advertising guru Gerald Rafshoon, Carter’s staff attempted to clarify the presidential aspirant’s positions on a variety of issues, but the perception that Carter was “fuzzy” on the issues lingered.

Furthermore, in mid-June, Eizenstat, Carter’s spokesman on the Democratic Platform Committee, revealed a more likely reason for Carter’s semantic differentiation between the two terms when he urged the delegates to avoid “buzz words” from the platforms.57 Eizenstat’s comments did not go unnoticed by Los Angeles Times staff writer and Senate reporter John H. Averill. “The drafting subcommittee opposed using the word amnesty,” he reported, “because of the refrain that ran through Sen. George S. McGovern’s 1972 campaign—'amnesty, abortion, and acid.'”58 Above all, Carter’s campaign staff sought to preserve unity in the Democratic Party; as a result, they compromised with members of the Democratic Platform Committee and agreed to consider pardons for military deserters on a “case-by-case basis” in addition to granting a “blanket pardon” for all draft evaders.

Despite the refinement of Carter’s position, the critique of his semantic differential did not cease. Journalists and political pundits first noted the synonymous definitions of ‘pardon’ and ‘amnesty’ and Carter’s arbitrary distinction, but soon his political opponents chimed in. By late August 1976, Republican vice presidential candidate and World War II combat veteran Robert Dole told an American Legion crowd in Seattle that President Ford’s position on the fate of draft evaders was “unequivocal . . . no blanket pardon, no blanket amnesty, no blanket clemency.” Furthermore, he noted he was “somewhat confused” by Carter’s speech and “by such semantics.” He said, “Webster’s New World Dictionary makes no such distinction. It defines ‘amnesty’ as a ‘general pardon.’”59

Some Americans came to Carter’s rescue with materials published on the opinion pages of major U.S. newspapers. For example, a pardon attorney explained to one reporter in a letter to the editor published in the Los Angeles Times that a pardon is a legal forgiveness that could restore voting rights.60 Likewise, the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal agreed the “semantic distinction” between amnesty and pardon was “a good one” because it did not suggest draft evaders were “right and society was wrong.” “Politicians oversimplify complex issues enough of their own volition,” the board continued. “Indeed, our worries about the rest of Mr. Carter’s positions are a bit mollified by his ability to treat the topics of abortion and prison reform with the same subtlety.”61

As a result of his lingering “fuzzy” image in the U.S. media, Carter was forced to continue to belabor the point to reporters. “Carter ended his interview with the reporters for the Washington Post, the New York Times, and the Baltimore Sun,” Lou Cannon, a political reporter for the Washington Post, noted on September 5, “by taking them into his well-stocked library to show them that his Webster’s Third International Dictionary has nuances of difference in the use of the words ‘pardon’ and ‘amnesty’ even while listening them as synonyms.” “I’m reserving the right to define the words the way I want to,” Carter jokingly, if begrudgingly, told reporters in reference to their continued negotiation over the meaning of the terms and his stance on the controversial campaign issue.62

By this point, Carter and the political journalists following his general-election campaign had endured moments of friction, most recently over what Carter perceived as the mishandling of news that summer in his hometown of Plains, Georgia.63 Nonetheless, when asked if he was concerned that his distinction in terms might give Ford the edge in the upcoming debates, he responded, “If he wants to debate the use of the word ‘pardon, that’s okay with me,” not so subtly alluding to Ford’s pardon of Nixon.

Before the first presidential debate in 1976, political newspaper commentators and letter-to-the-editor writers continued to discuss the semantics of Carter’s treatment of draft evaders. On September 7, for example, letter writer Glen Rice of California told readers of the Washington Post that Carter’s use of the term “pardon” was “self-contradictory, for if what you did was right there is nothing to be forgiven.” He continued by citing the Webster’s Unabridged Third International Dictionary definition, “the excusing of an offense,” and noted that pardon “implies that the pardoner is righteous.” “In the context of Vietnam,” Rice wrote, “pardon of United States citizens by their government, which government itself prosecuted undeclared a brutal war . . . is simply unacceptable.”64 For Rice, the nature of an unrighteous pardon was unthinkable, but for others, the political nature of Carter’s pledge of a pardon was just as disconcerting. That same day, in the Boston Globe, letter-to-the-editor writer Peter O. Cleveland called Carter’s amnesty pledge a “brilliant, political master-stroke” that enabled him to draw attention to Ford’s amnesty plan—a “flop”—and his pardon of Nixon.65 Furthermore, as the New York Times’s former executive editor and senior political columnist James “Scotty” Reston
contended in his October 2 analysis, "Pardon doesn’t start with a, as in acid, abortion, and amnesty, the three a’s that defeated George McGovern." These political commentators agreed: Carter was playing politics with his stance on the fate of draft evaders.

Whether Carter’s stance on the fate of draft evaders was a “brilliant political master-stroke” may have been a matter of opinion, but by early September 1976, most journalists and political commentators agreed that Carter’s stance was “political.” As early as January 1976, several reporters began noting that Carter had crafted a rhetorically facile position in order to appeal to various segments of the Democratic Party. New York Times reporter Christopher Lydon, for example, noted that Carter “bends gracefully” on the issues. “When he took some liberal criticism for opposing amnesty,” Lydon observed, “[Carter] thought it over and said he would grant the exiles pardons instead.”67 His colleague Tom Wicker, a Southern-born and Harvard-educated New York Times political reporter and columnist, agreed. Wicker’s past work earned him a place on Nixon’s master list of political opponents, and he did not spare Carter from his journalistic magnifying glass. He asserted the candidate was “playing to both sides” with his nuanced stance on amnesty.68

Not only did Carter craft a complex stance to attract various segments of the Democratic Party, but in March 1976 he also began to stress his position on draft evaders to diminish the criticism that he was avoiding issues. By April, the efforts of Eizenstat and others on Carter’s issues staff had paid off. “Close study of his remarks,” Ernest Conine, the Los Angeles Times foreign correspondent, observed, “reveals that James Earl Carter, Jr., has been taking something of a bum rap. He has talked a lot more about the issues than his critics allege.” Conine cited Carter’s amnesty position as an example.69

Carter and his campaign staff may have leveled “broad rhetoric” on amnesty and a range of other issues to appeal to a wide range of voters. In June 1976, however, the Democratic Platform Committee voted on the party’s amnesty platform, and a number of reporters acknowledged that Carter’s willingness to compromise and avoid “buzz words” such as amnesty united the Democratic Party. At Eizenstat’s behest, the committee removed the term amnesty from the party’s plank and instead favored a “blanket pardon” for draft evaders and a case-by-case judgment of military deserters.

The term pardon, as reporters, commentators, and letters to the editors recognized, allowed Carter both to avoid an association with controversial issues such as amnesty, abortion, and acid” that had come to define McGovern’s candidacy in 1972 and to invite a comparison with Ford—both his “bitter joke” of a clemency program and his pardon of Nixon.70 Furthermore, as one reporter noted, Carter cited his stance on amnesty as an example of “making tough decisions, if necessary” to quell the voices of his critics, who insisted he had avoided “unpopular or divisive stands.”71

Carter reiterated his position in late August 1976 in front of a group of Legionnaires in Seattle. It was one of the few summer campaign appearances on Carter’s schedule in advance of the launch of his general campaign in Warm Springs, Georgia. His issues staff had begun preparing for the Legionnaires speech several weeks prior with the knowledge that national media would likely pay close attention to its content. On August 15, Carter advisor Bill Johnston sent Eizenstat a memo regarding a recent questionnaire from veterans’ organizations and the issues Carter should cover in his speech. Third on the list was his blanket pardon. “The campaign pledge to pardon draft evaders has not been fully understood,” Johnston wrote, “and some groups and individuals still seem to believe that Carter will pardon deserters. There are 4,000 draft resisters, and 750,000 military veterans with less than honorable discharges, the majority of whom are deserters. Clarification of our position, along with the promise to review the status of those with ‘bad paper’ discharges is not particularly inconsistent with the desires of the Legion, and might be reported as a courageous reaffirmation of our position.”72 From the first memorandum they wrote about his candidacy in 1972, Carter’s advisers were determined to attract positive media attention. As the general election approached, they sought to rectify Carter’s “fuzzy” image with media coverage of his clear stance on important issues such as amnesty.73

Carter made the bold decision to announce his plan to pardon draft evaders at the American Legion National Convention; it was the next day that Dole, at the same convention, indicated that Gerald Ford, who provided draft evaders with a clemency program through a community service requirement, would offer no such pardon.74 Dole’s announcement predictably received a better reception from the American Legion audience, but the public pronouncements of both national politicians received extensive coverage in front-page news articles and on editorial pages in the top U.S. dailies, including the New York Times. Although the New York Times editorial staff later endorsed Carter, on this occasion they criticized Carter’s plan for being too limited.75 Other voices on the opinion page condemned Carter’s amnesty plan. One piece, for example, noted that “what the government did in Vietnam was wrong,” so the government should give amnesty instead of a pardon.76 Despite criticisms, Carter impressed the New York Times editorial staff with his move to present his plan to a controversial audience.77

The editorial staffs of other top U.S. dailies also reacted to Carter’s plan. The Los Angeles Times editorial staff, for example, supported Carter’s plan but acknowledged its flaws.78 Under the leadership of Otis Chandler, who became the Los Angeles Times publisher in 1960, the family-owned newspaper transitioned from a conservative partisan daily to a modern, nonpartisan news outlet, and the content of the editorial page reflected this mission.79 Indicative of its commitment, the Los Angeles Times editorial staff offered editorial space on the opinion page to staunch detractors. One letter writer, for example, avowed it was unfair and discriminatory to pardon only some of the Americans who were scarred by the Vietnam War.80 On the contrary, in an unorthodox move for an editorial staff that had gained attention in this era as a “billboard and cheering section for conservatives,” the Wall Street Journal concluded that the complex amnesty issues required complex solutions and that it was time for Americans to end the war by pardoning draft evaders.81

The commentators were accurate: Carter offered his “blanket pardon” as a “political move,” intended not only to “erase his image as a fuzzy politician who tries to please everyone,” but also to solidify “his standing among liberals.”82 Such commentators, however, differed in opinion about his decision to rearticulate his stance on amnesty to the Legionnaires. To some it was a “brilliant, political master-stroke.”83 To others it was a “misstep” or a key “tactical error” that strayed from his attempts to “project a centrist image” after his nomination at the Democratic National Convention in mid-July.84 Regardless, evident by the mixture of boos from veterans and cheers from war protesters during the Legionnaires speech, one thing remained certain: The fate of Vietnam draft evaders was a divisive issue. The fate of military deserters, however, was perhaps even more contentious.

When fashioning his position on amnesty, Carter and his issues staff monitored mainstream news media and polling data as well as the publications of various pro- and anti-amnesty organizations. From these publications, Carter and his staff gained a sense of public
opinion surrounding the issue. With such information, they crafted a promise of a blanket pardon for draft evaders during the early primary campaign; at that time, however, the retired naval officer did not offer his position on the fate of military deserters.

It was not until the Democratic Platform Committee pressured the Carter campaign in mid-June 1976 that he announced his approach toward military deserters. As U.S. news organizations reported, the issue of amnesty for evaders and deserters threatened the harmony of the Democratic Party. “The controversy was touched off by Sam Brown, Colorado’s state treasurer and one of the organizers of the anti-war movement,” the Los Angeles Times reported on June 16. The Democratic Platform Committee carried Brown’s amendment, which called for the pardon of both resisters and deserters, by a 54%-to-44 vote. When pressed by Carter’s representative Eizenstat, however, Brown revised the amendment to include a “case-by-case pardon for deserters.” Thus, Carter’s platform on Vietnam War-era pardons was solidified.85

Carter reiterated his plan for pardons throughout his campaign, most notably in his speech before the somewhat hostile Legionnaires in Seattle on August 25, 1976. At that time, he reminded the veterans of the timeline for his plan; if elected, he would issue his “blanket pardon” during the first week of his presidency. The Legionnaires booed this idea—a point that was repeated again and again in news articles. But Carter reiterated not only his blanket pardon strategy throughout his campaign but also his support for the U.S. military and its veterans. Carter himself was a veteran, and he related to other veterans by talking about his time at the U.S. Naval Academy and as a submarine commander46 and by acknowledging his son’s military service.97 He asserted most U.S. soldiers did not want to go to Vietnam,48 and he called Vietnam War veterans “heroes,” even if the war was wrong.99 Further, in October 1976, a couple of months after his Legionnaires speech and the announcement of Minnesotan Walter Mondale as his running mate, Carter announced the formation of a National Committee of Veterans for Carter-Mondale. He tasked the nineteen-member committee with addressing inflation, unemployment, and other veteran issues.90 The solution to the 10.3 percent unemployment rate among veterans, according to Carter, included better training and educational opportunities.91 Carter promised to empower the Veterans Administration to provide housing, medical, and training programs among other benefits.92

As Carter vowed to pardon draft dodgers and to help veterans, he also established his plan to consider pardons for military deserters case by case. Even the Legionnaires supported the case-by-case approach for deserters, and they were not alone. In early September 1976, a number of editorial boards, including that of the Los Angeles Times, and letter writers favored the case-by-case approach for deserters. “We support Carter’s position,” the Los Angeles Times editors wrote. “It is time to end the passions and rancor that still divide Americans on this issue. It is time to reunite thousands of families and to clear the records of those who otherwise would suffer the rest of their lives for a youthful decision, misguided or not.”93 Some favored a case-by-case approach to all pardons, noting “the future effects that could accrue from establishing a blanket pardon precedent.”94 Others still expressed concern that Carter’s plan did not extend far enough. “The pardon Carter is promising to draft evaders will only reach a very small proportion of those people whose lives have been affected by resistance to the Vietnam encounter,” Bonnie Arnold of Burbank, Calif., told readers of the Los Angeles Times. Only 12,000 draft resisters would be eligible for the blanket pardon, according to Arnold, but estimates revealed one million Americans needed “amnesty because of their resistance to a war they considered unnecessary, unjust, and too real.”95 Included in Arnold’s figure were an estimated 200,000 draft non-registrants and 700,000 veterans with dishonorable discharges.

Concerned voices about Carter’s “blanket pardon” echoed louder as the election approached. For example, polls revealed Carter’s position on pardons for draft evaders disproportionally displeased Southern voters. Some Americans wrote letters to the editor to acknowledge their frustration with Carter’s plan, while others wrote in support of blanket pardons and even amnesty for deserters. U.S. newspapers covered the efforts of amnesty groups, members of Congress, and churches who sought an extension of Carter’s mercy.

Thus, an examination of the top six circulating U.S. dailies provides insight into the structure of feeling of Carter and his campaign staff, the American public, including war veterans and war protesters, and members of news organizations, including editorial boards and commentators. Newspaper opinion pages offer the greatest range of perspectives from those of editorial boards and syndicated columnists such as Evans and Novak to letter writers such as Bonnie Arnold. Journalistic sources in news and feature stories include leaders of pro-amnesty groups, draft dodgers living in exile, and mothers whose sons died in Vietnam. Their on-the-record comments give further insight into the enduring remnants of the structure of feeling in the U.S. presidential election of 1976. The official comments from Carter and his campaign staff also add another complex layer in the different ways of thinking about the domestic consequences of the Vietnam War. Such political discourse and media, from alternative newspapers such as Amex-Canada to mainstream publications such as the New York Times, elucidate a historical understanding of the nuanced consciousness of a nation still grappling with a divisive war. The top U.S. dailies negotiated the Carter candidacy and the semantics of amnesty versus pardon through the issue of the fate of draft dodgers and military deserters. Such mediated messages helped to shape Carter’s campaign platform and public opinion about his candidacy in the 1976 presidential election.

After Carter’s victory over Ford in one of the closest elections in modern U.S. history, individuals such as Fritz Efaw sought to ensure that Carter would “make good” on his campaign promises.96 “A promise to pardon resisters is the thing Gov. Carter ran on,” Efaw told the Boston Globe on November 7, 1976. “He owes this to the people who voted for him.”

Efaw and other amnesty group members did not stop there: They pushed Carter to reconsider his plan for military evaders. The National Council for Universal and Unconditional Amnesty determined to present the president-elect with a petition signed by more than one million Americans demanding amnesty for all. Members of Congress such as Representative Edward I. Koch of New York and churches such as Boston’s Arlington Street Church joined the battle for “total and unconditional amnesty for all who resisted the Vietnam war,” Reverend Victor H. Carpenter, Jr. of Boston’s Unitarian-Universalist Church, the first church to give sanctuary to draft resisters, dubbed the denial of amnesty to any resisters or deserters as “racist and elitist.” Others agreed and noted that, unlike draft evaders, most deserters were “poor, undereducated and black.”97 Jack Calhoun, a deserter active in a Canadian exile organization, further characterized Carter’s plan as elitist and racist: “The Carter pardon is so far open only to still-wanted draft resisters . . . the smallest, most middle-class and whitest group in need of amnesty.”98

92 Journalism History 43:2 (Summer 2017)
“Many [military deserters] make up Jimmy Carter’s strongest constituency,” the Boston Globe’s editorial board, which under the leadership of Tom Winship helped expose the credibility gap by publishing the Pentagon Papers in 1971, reminded the president-elect. “And many of them are suffering further alienation now because their bad records or less than honorable discharges have made them ineligible for jobs.” These were the same men, commentators insisted, that Carter had initially sought to help with his “blanket pardon.”

One military deserter-turned-exile-in-Canada pointed out that “a deserter is a resister who just found out too late what the war was about.” These opinions, demanding Carter keep his campaign promise and extend the “blanket pardon” to military deserters, continued during the eleven weeks between his election on November 2, 1976, and his inauguration on January 20, 1977.

Throughout Carter’s transition into the White House, his staff attempted to draft a blueprint for his presidency. With pressure from interest groups such as Amex-Canada continuing to mount, Carter assigned his Department of Justice liaison David Berg and his chief adviser Charles Kirbo to begin preliminary work on his executive pardon. In the immediate aftermath of his narrow victory, Carter faced questions about whether he would adhere to his campaign platform. To ensure special interest groups such as pro-amnesty organizations of his commitment to his promises, he leaked a memo to the press in Washington in late November. The memo indicated that during his first week in office Carter would “present his amnesty or pardon program on a two-part basis: 1. Those who have Selective Service problem, i.e., fled to Canada, will be given blanket amnesty—no strings attached. 2. Military deserters will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis with possible amnesty or alternative-service condition.”

In December, talks about a large-scale petition to extend a blanket pardon to military deserters circulated among pro-amnesty groups. Carter’s staff redoubled efforts to investigate Ford’s failed clemency plan, to draft a presidential pardon and policy for deserters, and to consider requests and petitions to extend their blanket pardon to military deserters. “We’re trying to decide how to word the pardon,” Carter told reporters on December 5 as he informed them Kirbo was considering pleas to extend the blanket pardon to deserters. Less than a week later, however, Carter’s aides cautioned deserters not to “raise hopes too high.”

Even still, amnesty groups made their case to the president-elect. In mid-December, Kovic, William Thompson of the World Council of Churches, ex-Green Beret Gerry Condon, antiwar Gold Star Mother Louise Ransom, and others in the pro-amnesty community petitioned Kirbo to extend the blanket pardon. Newspaper reporters covered the event and included the voices of individuals such as Ransom. The death of her oldest son would be meaningless unless Carter granted amnesty “to symbolize devotion to freedom of conscience and the right to dissent,” Ransom, through tears, told Kirbo, who insisted he would have to examine their numbers against the Pentagon and Department of Justice records. Avoiding an “expensive and cumbersome bureaucracy” might “tempt” Carter to consider total amnesty, columnist Mary McGrory told readers a day later on December 11. So, too, might Ford’s decision to reconsider total amnesty at the request of Jane Hart, the recent widow of a friend and Michigan senator.

Thereafter, the president-elect’s staff released news that they had reached a “substantial agreement” on a plan to extend [Carter’s] promise of clemency for draft violators to 250,000 Vietnam-era servicemen with tarnished military records. “We’ve agreed in substance on what our recommendations to Governor Carter will be with respect to the pardon and treatment of military offenders,” Berg told reporters. His use of terms such as “military offenders” and “executive order” signaled to some reporters that Carter might extend his pardon to 250,000 former servicemen. As Inauguration Day drew near, despite recommendations from former Ford aides to pardon all “non-violent crimes related to the war,” Carter told reporters he had “no inclination of chang[ing] my campaign pledge” and dwindled hopes of an extended pardon.

Carter’s decision not to extend his blanket pardon to military evaders was likely rooted in the divisive nature of such a policy. Polls yet revealed those in favor of amnesty for military evaders remained around 20 percent. Letters to the editor around the United States supported such polling data by protesting blanket pardons to military deserters, and in some cases, even draft resisters; they cited the potential for future problems raised by the precedent. As one letter writer, Lionel Lokos of New York, noted: “By his blanket pardon—Carter has just told America’s youth that they do not have to serve in the armed forces, if they don’t want to.” The opinion of Lokos was apt. Historians have observed that Carter’s policy contributed to the acceleration of the conversion of the U.S. military to an all-volunteer force. Another letter writer agreed: “[Carter’s] dishonorable action justifiably established a precedent for our yellow-bellied draft resisters—the right to decide freely whether or not they desire to come to our country’s defense. This letter adds yet another voice to the chorus of many thousands who were quick to express their indignation over President Carter’s unpardonable action.”

Washington Post editors agreed—a pardon for “defectors” was a “no-win proposition” for Carter:

Performance on this campaign promise is not going to be popular among many Americans. Those who resisted the war and joined the protest against it are not likely to be satisfied unless Mr. Carter does his pardoning in a way that suggests the ‘defectors’ were right and that the war was wrong. And those who engaged in the war or supported it and who care most deeply about its hundreds and thousands of victims . . . are going to resent any suggestion that those who served were wrong.

Such opinions seemed accurate. As Carter’s inauguration drew closer, war protesters pushed toward amnesty for defectors as well as reconciliation with Vietnam, including supporting Vietnam’s entry into the United Nations and funding to reconstruct Vietnam. Conversely, U.S. veterans who served in the Vietnam War expressed concern for the honor of Americans who died in Vietnam. For example, one serviceman who had been a prisoner of war in Vietnam left his medals, including two Purple Hearts, on a random soldier’s grave and requested to leave the Navy in protest of Carter’s amnesty plan for draft evaders.

True to his campaign promise, on January 21, 1977, the day after his inauguration, Carter granted Executive Order 11967, a pardon to all Vietnam War draft dodgers. Carter’s “blanket pardon” applied only to civilians who were convicted of violating the Selective Service Act by evading service or failing to register between August 4, 1964, and March 28, 1973. Although the final iteration of Carter’s plan included civilians who failed to register for the draft, it failed to address the estimated 500,000 to one million military deserters, who either went absent without leave from the military or deserted during the war. To some opponents of Carter’s actions, the day of the pardon represented “one of the
darkest and saddest days in American history,” one that would set a precedent for future military desertion during times of war. To others, it represented a failure on Carter’s part to heal completely the domestic wounds of the Vietnam War by pardoning all of those who objected to serving. Some realized the difficult spot Carter had been put in. “There was no possible way for President Carter to satisfy everyone in dealing with the resisters to the Vietnam War,” one letter-to-the-editor writer noted. “He should be commended for facing the issue as a moral obligation and responding to it in the only way which could meet the maximum ethical standards.”

As this discourse analysis of the top six U.S. dailies shows, throughout the course of the 1976 election, Carter’s nuanced position and murky semantic distinction exasperated many of the journalists covering his campaign. After Carter issued his presidential pardon, public opinion polls revealed the majority of Americans opposed Carter’s blanket amnesty. The polling data reflect the structure of feeling the researchers encountered in the pages of the circulation-leading newspapers, including that in the source quotations in news articles and in the words of editorial board members, commentators, and letter-to-the-editor writers. These texts provide insights into the tone of the draft dodger and military resister issue in a way that era’s public opinion polls cannot. News and feature stories reveal that Carter’s actions left many U.S. veterans of the Vietnam War and their loved ones unsatisfied. Meanwhile, those who fled the war felt as though his actions were not enough; they sought pardons for Americans who objected to the war after entering the battle, and they desired acknowledgment that their reaction to an unrighteous war was indeed righteous. As predicted by Washington Post editors, Carter’s policy was indeed a “no-win proposition,” and in an attempt to please everyone, he had pleased few.

Although Carter sought to encourage those who fled abroad—mostly to Canada and Sweden—to return home, many did not. Individuals such as George Meals of Atlanta had settled into Swedish life. “I’m in the 80 per cent bracket,” the sound technician told Boston Globe reporters in December 1976 as he acknowledged his “secure” future in Sweden. Wisconsin-born draft dodger Chuck Poulfen, living in Vancouver Province, agreed. “It’s a step in the right direction, and it’ll be nice to visit, Mr. Carter. But most of us are already home.” As a Boston Globe headline indicated, many war resisters realized they did not “want to go home again.” And many did not. In the six months after the pardon, only eighty-five exiles permanently returned to the United States, and from April to September 1977, only 432 deserters participated in Carter’s special case-by-case review program.

By promising draft dodger pardons, Carter had intended to “get the Vietnam war over with,” but the domestic wounds of the war lingered into the twenty-first century. Often the debate over the Vietnam War focuses on U.S. involvement in Vietnam as based on immoral notions of imperialism that proved disastrous from the onset; the other side of the debate considers U.S. involvement a noble endeavor that failed because of misrepresentation, mismanagement, lack of support, and ineffective foreign policy initiatives. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, however, draft evasion continued as a controversial, divisive issue. So, too, did military desertion. Decades later, the military continued to hunt some Vietnam-era deserters. For example, Allen Abney was prosecuted in 2006 for deserting thirty-eight years earlier. Furthermore, military desertion remained a prominent issue in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, evidenced by the case of Bowe Bergdahl, a U.S. Army deserter held captive by the Taliban-aligned Haqqani network in Afghanistan from June 2009 until his release in May 2014. The war on terrorism, like the war on communism in the 1960s and 1970s, has resulted in divisive socio-political milieu, the domestic wounds of which create casualties in the form of military deserters.

While Carter desired to end the Vietnam War once and for all, such a feat was never really possible, for the fate of draft evaders and military deserters was just one in an enigma of issues associated with the Southeast Asian conflict. For many U.S. veterans, the initial days and years of societal readjustment concurrent with the Carter campaign proved difficult. They suffered physical maladies from the effects of Agent Orange and psychological torment from post-traumatic stress disorder. Marginalized and unappreciated, Vietnam War veterans were often stereotyped as troublesome drug addicts. Many of the same challenges identified by Carter’s National Committee of Veterans remain as challenges today. Although Carter’s executive order pardoned those who violated the Selective Service Act, it did not “get the Vietnam war over with.” Rather, the war changed how Americans think about militarism and continues to serve as a reference point in ongoing discussions about domestic policies associated with military deserters and military veterans. In this manner, the domestic legacy of the Vietnam War remains interwoven throughout American society and experiences.

NOTES

4 McGrory, “Modest Hope for Amnesty.”
5 Ibid.
8 Riley, “Veterans Invade Tunnery’s Office.”
11 In the aftermath of the conflict in Vietnam, Americans struggled over how to memorialize those who perished in battle, how to integrate returning veterans into American society, and whether and how to restore relations in Southeast Asia. See Appy, American Reckoning, 221-305; and Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz, “The Vietnam Veterans Memorial,” 376-420.
In his infamous *Playboy* interview, Carter told Scheer: “The traveling press have zero interest in any issue unless it’s a matter of making a mistake. . . . What they’re looking for is a 47-second argument between me and another candidate or something like that. There’s nobody in the back of this plane who would ask an issue question unless he thought he could trick me into some crazy statement.” One journalist later retorted that Carter’s was the “least issue-oriented campaign since the nineteenth century.” See Robert Scheer, “*Playboy* Interview: Jimmy Carter,” *Playboy*, November 1976, 63-86.

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24 Hallin, *The Uncensored War*, 238.


26 “Universal and Unconditional Amnesty.” A 1976 article appearing in the Los Angeles Times claimed that 13,222 evaders fled to other countries, while there were nearly 93,000 military deserts. See “It Is Time,” *Los Angeles Times*, Sept. 1, 1976. Also see John Whiteclay Chambers, *The Oxford Companion to American Military History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1999), 238.


39 Hallin, *The Uncensored War*, 238.


41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid. The journalist, further interrogating the notion that Carter was fuzzy on the issues, then referred to Carter’s position paper on pardons for draft evaders, asking Carter to describe his difficulty at arriving on the position.


45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.


9 See, for example, Kenneth Reich, “Among the Media: Carter Press Chief Polite but Peppery,” Los Angeles Times, Aug. 8, 1976.


9 “It Is Time.”


9 Shogan, “Carter Seeks to Prove that He’s Not ‘Fuzzy’ on Issues.”

9 Cleveland, “Carter Amnesty Pledge a Masterstroke.”

9 Ibid.

9 Averill, “Unified Democrats Speedily OK Platform Conforming to Carter’s Views.”


9 Ibid.


98 Veterans Committee for Carter-Mondale Announced,” news release, Oct. 11, 1976, box 421, JCP.


99 Ibid.

99 “It Is Time.”


99 terHorst, “Bleeding Hearts Set to Test Carter.”


99 Ibid.


99 Ibid.


99 “Those Who Served.”


99 Ibid.


99 Ibid.


99 “Those Who Served.”


99 Ibid.

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