

As of January 7, 2015

## **Kari Joseph Olsen, CPA, CMA**

---

Leventhal School of Accounting  
Marshall School of Business  
University of Southern California

Phone: (801) 726 - 9814  
Email: kari.olsen.2015@marshall.usc.edu

### **Employment**

---

#### ***University of Southern California***

Research Assistant, Marshall School of Business (2010 – expected 2015)

#### ***Brigham Young University-Hawaii***

Instructor (2010)

#### ***Brigham Young University***

Instructor (2010)

Research Assistant, Marriott School of Business (2007 – 2009)

#### ***KPMG***

Audit intern (2008)

### **Education**

---

#### ***University of Southern California***

PhD in Business Administration—Accounting (2010 – expected 2015)

#### ***Brigham Young University***

M.S., Accountancy

B.S., Accountancy

Minor in Economics

(2006 - 2009)

### **Research Interests**

---

Management control systems, personality characteristics, strategic decision making, and performance measurement.

## Research Papers

---

### Publications

Young, S.M., Dworkis, K.K., Du, F., and Olsen, K.J. (2015). It's All About All of Us – The Rise of Narcissism and Its Implications for Management Control System Research. *Journal of Management Accounting Research*, *In Press*.

Olsen, K.J., Dworkis, K.K., and Young, S.M. (2014). CEO Narcissism and Accounting: a picture of profits. *Journal of Management Accounting Research*. Vol. 26, No. 2. Pp. 243 – 267.

Swain, M.R. and Olsen, K.J. (2012). From Student to Accounting Professional: A Longitudinal Study of the Filtering Process. *Issues in Accounting Education*. Vol. 27, No. 1. Pp. 17-52.

### Working Papers

Olsen, K.J. and Stekelberg, J. (2015). CEO Narcissism and Corporate Tax Sheltering. *Revise & Resubmit at Journal of the American Taxation Association*.

Holderness, D.K., Olsen, K.J., and Thornock, T.A. (2015). Who Are *You* to Tell Me *That?!* The Moderating Effect of Performance Feedback Source and Psychological Entitlement on Individual Performance.

Dworkis, K.K., Olsen, K.J., and Young, S.M. (2015). The Future of Management Control Systems: A Comparative Study of Baby Boomers, Generation X, and Millennials.

Holderness, D.K., Olsen, K.J., and Thornock, T.A. (2015). How Subtle Performance Monitoring Helps, Really Helps, and Hurts: The Impact of Psychological Entitlement and Monitoring Environment on Performance and Misreporting.

Olsen, K.J. (2015). For the Love of the Game? Ownership and Control in the NBA. *Dissertation*.

### Work in Process

## Teaching Experience

---

University of Southern California

Instructor—Spring 2013

- Introduction to Managerial Accounting (student evaluations: 4.87 / 5.00)

Brigham Young University-Hawaii

Instructor—Summer 2010

- Introduction to Managerial Accounting
- Introduction to Financial Accounting

Brigham Young University

Instructor—Winter 2010

- Introduction to Financial Accounting (student evaluations: 7.30 / 8.00)

## Professional Service

---

### Committees

*American Accounting Association*

Student Member of the Membership Advisory Committee (2011—current)

### Journal Reviewing

Ad hoc reviewer for *Journal of Accounting Education*

### Conference Reviewing

AAA 2015 Management Accounting Section Meeting

### Discussant

AAA 2014 Annual Meeting

AAA 2013 Management Accounting Section Meeting

## Grants, Awards, and Honors

---

### Research

\$16,000 grant from the IMA Research Foundation—2014

\$4,000 grant from BYU Graduate Studies Mentoring Research Award—2009

\$1,500 grant from BYU's Office of Research & Creative Arts (ORCA)—2009

### Teaching

USC Mary Pickford Foundation Doctoral Teaching Award—2014

USC Marshall PhD Teaching Award—2013

## **Fellowships/Scholarships**

Deloitte Foundation Doctoral Fellowship—2014  
CMA Doctoral Scholarship from the Institute of Management Accountants—2012  
Brigham Young University Graduate Scholarships—2008-2009  
Brigham Young University Undergraduate Scholarships—2006-2008  
Robert C. Byrd Scholarship from the Utah State Board of Education—2006-2008  
State of Utah Sterling Scholar

## **Certifications and Professional Associations**

---

### *American Institute of Certified Public Accountants*

Member since 2011

- Certified Public Accountant (CPA)—State of Colorado (2011)

### *Institute of Management of Accountants*

Member since 2007

- Certified Management Accountant (CMA)—2013

### *American Accounting Association*

Member since 2011

## **Conference and Workshop Presentations**

---

AAA Accounting PhD Rookie Recruiting & Research Camp—2014

AAA Western Region Meeting—2013, 2014

BYU Accounting Research Symposium—2008, 2012, 2013, 2014

USC Graduate Student Government Poster Symposium—2012

## **Conference Participation**

---

AAA Annual Meeting—2013, 2014

AAA Accounting PhD Rookie Recruiting & Research Camp—2014

AAA Management Accounting Section meeting—2012, 2013

AAA Western Region Meeting—2013, 2014

BYU Accounting Research Symposium—2007 - 2009, 2011 - 2014

SEC and Financial Reporting Institute Conference—2011, 2013

IMA Student Leadership Conference—2007

## **Other**

---

### **Foreign languages**

Romanian—speaking (advanced), writing (intermediate), reading (intermediate)

## References

**S. Mark Young** (*Dissertation Committee Chair*)

University of Southern California

markyoun@marshall.usc.edu

213-740-4848

**Mark T. Soliman** (*PhD Program Director*)

University of Southern California

msoliman@marshall.usc.edu

213-740-4842

**Eric J. Allen** (*Dissertation Committee Member*)

University of Southern California

ericalle@marshall.usc.edu

213-740-0007

## Paper Abstracts (Publications)

---

**Young, S.M., Dworkis, K.K., Du, F., and Olsen, K.J. (2015). It's All About All of Us – The Rise of Global Narcissism and Its Implications for Management Control System Research. *Journal of Management Accounting Research, In Press.***

While the construct of Narcissism has existed for well over a hundred years, it has become the most discussed personality disorder of recent times and appears to be influencing organizational and culture and control systems. While systematic research on narcissism has been conducted at the individual level, research on its effects in organizations is still in its nascent stages. Our objectives in this paper are threefold: (1) to present an overview of the narcissism construct and its causes, (2) to review how narcissistic employees behave differently in work settings than less narcissistic employees, and (3) to develop a framework for research from which testable hypotheses are drawn about how increased levels of employee narcissism can affect the design and performance of management control systems.

**Olsen, K.J., Dworkis, K.K., and Young, S.M. (2014). CEO Narcissism and Accounting: a picture of profits. *Journal of Management Accounting Research, Vol. 26, No. 2. Pp. 243 – 267.***

This study investigates the relationship between narcissistic personality characteristics in CEOs of *Fortune 500* companies and financial performance measures of earnings-per-share and stock valuation. Using panel data from 1992 through 2009, we show that firms with narcissistic CEOs have higher earnings-per-share and share price than those with non-narcissistic CEOs. We examine the mechanism driving the observed results and find that narcissistic CEOs are more likely to increase reported EPS through real and operational activities rather than accrual-based manipulations. The findings suggest that narcissistic personality characteristics of top executives affect financial performance measures through the executive's decisions and influence over the firm's operational activities rather than through accrual and accounting decisions.

**Swain, M.R. and Olsen, K.J. (2012). From Student to Accounting Professional: A Longitudinal Study of the Filtering Process. *Issues in Accounting Education*. Vol. 27, No. 1. Pp. 17-52.**

Over a 15-year period, we observe the pattern of personality types of students that come into introductory accounting classes, into the accounting major, into the accounting profession, and that remain in accounting as a long-term career. While most research has concentrated on either education or professional careers, our study represents perhaps the first significant longitudinal study employing a within-subject design to examine both the accounting education decision, and the decision to pursue and remain with an accounting career. By employing mediational analysis techniques, our study examines the filtering process that leads to the personality makeup of practicing accountants. Our analysis extends beyond descriptive correlations of MBTI personality types majoring in accounting to provide evidence of how MBTI personality type preferences influence career decisions through mediated measures of attitude, intent, and performance. In particular, we demonstrate clearly both the nature and the preponderance of personality types in both the accounting major and accounting profession who prefer gathering information based on observations of concrete data versus gathering insight based on an intuitive exploration of meanings and relationships—classified in the MBTI personality literature as Sensors versus Intuitors, respectively.

## Paper Abstracts (Working Papers)

---

**Olsen, K.J. and Stekelberg, J. (2015). CEO Narcissism and Corporate Tax Sheltering. *Revise & Resubmit at Journal of the American Taxation Association.***

We examine the effect of CEO narcissism on corporate tax sheltering. Narcissism is a multifaceted personality trait associated with a sense of superiority and a propensity to engage in questionable behavior. Narcissists feel that they are above the law and are aggressive in pursuing what they believe is theirs. Narcissists also possess heightened motivations to pursue rewards or desirable outcomes while only being weakly motivated to avoid negative outcomes. Consistent with these behavioral tendencies of narcissistic individuals, we document a positive association between CEO narcissism and multiple measures of corporate tax outcomes associated with tax sheltering. Our study contributes to the literature by documenting a mechanism through which the *individual* personality characteristics of the CEO can affect *firm*-level tax policies.

**Holderness, D.K., Olsen, K.J., and Thornock, T.A. (2015). Who Are *You* to Tell Me *That*?! The Moderating Effect of Performance Feedback Source and Psychological Entitlement on Individual Performance.**

Negative performance feedback (i.e., knowledge that one's performance is below a certain standard) is an important feature of management control systems and has been shown to have a motivating effect on future performance. As organizational structures have become more flat, the possibility of performance feedback being provided by individuals at various levels of the organization (e.g., superior-level, peer-level, etc.) has increased. However, recent research in organizational behavior suggests that one's feelings of psychological entitlement (i.e., the sense that one deserves more and is entitled to more than others) may moderate the performance response to the source of negative performance feedback. We conduct an experiment wherein we manipulate the source level of negative performance feedback and examine how psychological entitlement moderates the relationship between feedback source and subsequent performance in a fixed pay environment. We find that when negative feedback is issued by a superior-level source, greater levels of psychological entitlement lead to higher performance. In contrast, when negative feedback is issued by a peer-level source, greater levels of psychological entitlement lead to lower performance improvement. These findings demonstrate that tailoring performance feedback delivery based on individual characteristics can improve the effectiveness of management control systems and help companies achieve organizational objectives.



**Dworkis, K.K., Olsen, K.J, and Young, S.M. (2015). The Future of Management Control Systems: A Comparative Study of Baby Boomers, Generation X, and Millennials.**

U.S. organizations are now populated by three distinct generations of employees: the Baby Boomers (those born before 1967), Generation X (those born between 1968 and 1980), and the Millennial Generation (those born between 1981 and 1995). In this study, we examine differences in work attitude and motivation-related personality characteristics across these three generations that can influence key design choices and outcomes of an effective management control system. Results indicate strong similarities in work attitudes and motivation-related personality characteristics between Baby Boomers and Generation X, but a stark contrast in work attitudes and motivation-related personality characteristics with the Millennial Generation, which in turn, affect their job satisfaction and job loyalty. The dramatic shift in personality and attitudes we observe in the entering generation of employees has significant implications for management control system design and implementation.

**Holderness, D.K., Olsen, K.J., and Thornock, T.A. (2015). How Subtle Performance Monitoring Helps, Really Helps, and Hurts: The Impact of Psychological Entitlement and Monitoring Environment on Performance and Misreporting.**

Aligning the goals of employees with those of owners is an ever-present dilemma facing managers. A common tool used to assist with this problem is performance monitoring. Knowing that one's performance will be reviewed can motivate and control behavior. However, responses to control mechanisms vary with individual characteristics. Recent research on psychological entitlement attests to this varied pattern of responses (Holderness et al. 2014; Harvey and Harris 2010). Psychological entitlement represents one's sense of deservingness for rewards, regardless of effort or performance (Campbell et al 2004). Since rewards are often based on performance, understanding how the trait of psychological entitlement affects responses to the monitoring environment is of particular interest to managers and management accountants. This study examines how the personality trait of psychological entitlement interacts with the performance monitoring environment to affect performance and misreporting. Using a paper-based maze task (Freeman and Gelber 2010), we find that subtle, ex-post performance monitoring increases performance and decreases misreporting compared to no ex-post performance monitoring. Further, we find that this effect is amplified for high levels of psychological entitlement such that performance (misreporting) is greater (lower) for higher levels of psychological entitlement with some monitoring compared to lower levels of psychological entitlement. Lastly, we find in a supplemental analysis that for high levels of psychological entitlement, outside-the-box thinking is significantly reduced by subtle, ex-post monitoring.

**Olsen, K.J. (2015). For the Love of the Game? Ownership and Control in the NBA. *Dissertation.***

The National Basketball Association (NBA) presents a setting wherein agency frictions and other causes of managerial myopia, which are common in many organizational settings, are limited for NBA team owners. Much like managers of any business, NBA team owners make decisions about how to pursue their objectives, which in this setting include clearly defined strategic objectives of winning games and maximizing profits. I examine NBA team owners' resource-allocation decisions related to these objectives by analyzing the effect of team-level player compensation on on-the-court (winning) and off-the-court (financial performance) outcomes. Results show that spending more on team-level player compensation has a positive effect on team's winning, yet is also associated with lower current operational profits. However, results also show that spending more on team-level player compensation leads to higher team values due to an increase in revenue generation ability and brand value from winning more games. Rather than winning and profits being alternative objectives to satisfy, the realization of the one objective (long-term profits) is contingent upon investments leading to the satisfaction of the other objective (winning). Hence, results suggest that NBA team owners who pursue short-term operational profits by spending less on team-level player compensation likely do so at the expense of real-economic future value. That is, despite not facing typical causes of managerial myopia, team owners may pursue myopic behavior.